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In Reading Law, Justice Scalia and his coauthor, Professor Bryan 
Garner, promise that text-based, statutory interpretation can be rendered 
more predictable and constraining if 57 "valid canons" are followed. 
Admiring the enterprise, this Review maintains that this regime would 
not solve the problems of unpredictability or judicial policymaking 
Reading Law identifies. For any difficult case, there will be as many as 
twelve to fifteen relevant "valid canons" cutting in different directions, 
leaving considerable room for judicial cherry-picking. 
Another problem afflicts their enterprise. Almost all of Scalia and 
Garner's "valid canons" are, rather than strictly textualist, either explic 
itly grounded upon a normative precept or dependent on norms that re 
quire an assessment of a statute's purpose to determine its application. 
Justice Scalia's new textualism insists that judges avoid value judg 
ments—but the Scalia and Garner canons make value judgments inevi 
table. Indeed, canons-based textualism would (if widely followed) be 
strongly undemocratic. We now have evidence that congressional draft 
ers are not aware of most of Scalia and Garner's canons—and several of 
their canons are rules that Congress cannot follow when enacting com 
plicated legislation. 
This Review concludes with a defense of the wide variety of canons 
actually followed by the Supreme Court. No valid approach to statutory 
interpretation can ignore the precedent-based canons or neglect the legis 
lative history and purpose canons that the Court has long followed. Un 
fortunately, no canons-based regime will deliver complete predictability, 
judicial constraint, or fair results, but the multifactored regime followed 
by the Court is the best that mere judges can devise. 
* 
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Introduction 
Justice Antonin Scalia is the leading theorist as well as practitioner of 
what has been dubbed the new textualism} His judicial opinions, speeches, 
articles, and books have generated great debates, which have (ironically) 
revealed a substantial consensus about the ground rules for statutory in 
terpretation. Thus, virtually all theorists and judges are "textualists," in 
the sense that all consider the text the starting point for statutory inter 
pretation and follow statutory plain meaning if the text is clear.2 How 
ever, Justice Scalia's new book, coauthored with linguist Bryan Garner, 
reveals that virtually all theorists and judges are also "purposivists," in the 
sense that all believe that statutory interpretation ought to advance statu 
tory purposes, so long as such interpretations do not impose on words a 
meaning they will not bear.3 And virtually all theorists and judges insist 
that statutory context is important in discerning the meaning of statutory 
texts. 
So what has the debate been all about? Doctrinally, the big debate 
has been whether interpretive context can include the internal "legisla 
tive history" preceding a statute's enactment into law. The new textualists 
maintain that legislative history should be marginalized or ignored, un 
less used simply like a dictionary of word use; old textualists, purposivists, 
and pragmatic interpreters maintain that legislative history is often rele 
vant and useful to figure out or confirm statutory meaning.4 Theoreti 
cally, the big debate has focused on what the role of judges should be. 
Most textualists maintain that judges interpreting statutes ought to be 
nothing more than the faithful agents of the enacting legislature; most 
purposivists and pragmatic interpreters maintain that judges are partners 
in governance and ought to consider that role when they apply statutes 
to new circumstances.5 Institutionally, the debate has pitted new textual 
1. William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 621, 624 (1990) 
[hereinafter Eskridge, New Textualism]. For Justice Scalia's classic articulation, see gener 
ally Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation (1997) [hereinafter Scalia, Interpretation], 
2. Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 
16 (2012); Jonathan T. Molot, The Rise and Fall of Textualism, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 3 
(2006). 
3. See Scalia & Garner, supra note 2, at 63-65 ("A textually permissible interpretation 
that furthers rather than obstructs the document's purpose should be favored."). 
Although Scalia and Garner assail theories of interpretation where "purpose is king," 
pushing text to one side, id. at 18, virtually no one advocates or follows such a theory. Most 
purpose-based theories are similar to the one endorsed by Scalia and Garner, where 
judges follow the interpretation that is most consistent with the statutory purpose but not 
if the interpretation would impose on the text a meaning it will not bear. E.g., Henry M. 
Hart, Jr. 8c Albert M. Sacks, The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and 
Application of Law 112 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994). 
4. Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 1, at 29-37; John F. Manning, What Divides 
Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 70, 75-76 (2006). 
5. Compare John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 Colum. 
L. Rev. 1, 127 (2001) (arguing courts should be faithful agents of Congress in statutory 
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ists, who maintain that the rule of law as well as democracy requires that 
judges be tightly "constrained" by strict rules, against pragmatists and 
purposivists, who are concerned with enabling judges to adapt old stat 
utes to new problems and who believe that the process of legal reasoning 
from text, legislative purpose, and precedent constrains judges.6 
In Reading Law, Justice Scalia and his coauthor expand upon and 
provide examples for Scalia's longstanding position in these debates: 
namely, that it is imperative that judges be tightly constrained or they will 
read their own values into statutes,7 that the textualist methodology actu 
ally does constrain judges,8 and that legislative history does not.9 Scalia 
and Garner depict current practice as turning judges loose to read any 
thing they want into statutes; thus, by their account, using legislative his 
tory to figure out statutory meaning is like "entering a crowded cocktail 
party and looking over the heads of the guests for one's friends"10 (para 
phrasing the late Judge Harold Leventhal). In contrast, the proper tex 
tualist approach, they say, "will curb—even reverse—the tendency of 
judges to imbue authoritative texts with their own policy preferences"11 
and "will provide greater certainty in the law, and hence greater predict 
ability and greater respect for the rule of law."12 
Critics of the new textualism claim that its methodology is no more 
constraining than a methodology that considers legislative history as an 
interpretive aid.13 Indeed, because the regulatory terms that generate the 
interpretation), with Stephen Breyer, Making Our Democracy Work: A Judge's View 88 
105 (2011) (arguing courts should be cooperative partners with other institutions). I have 
argued previously that this debate is overstated, for a truly "faithful agent" is one who 
adapts old directives to deal productively with new and typically unanticipated circum 
stances. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning Legislative Supremacy, 78 Geo. L.J. 319, 322 
(1989). 
6. Compare Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 1, at 18-25 (criticizing purpose-based 
theories as insufficiently constraining and urging textualism as a more constraining 
method), and Frank Easterbrook, Foreword to Scalia 8c Garner, supra note 2, at xxi, xxii 
xxiv (asserting that great contribution of strict rules for statutory interpretation is that they 
hedge injudicial discretion), with William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory 
Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 321, 382 (1990) [hereinafter 
Eskridge & Frickey, Practical Reasoning] (positing that statutory interpretation methodol 
ogy is eclectic and constraint comes from convergence of diverse materials). 
7. Scalia 8c Garner, supra note 2, at 9-10. 
8. Id. at 15-18. 
9. Id. at 269-91, 344-46. 
10. Id. at 377. 
11. Id. at xxviii. 
12. Id. at xxix. These points are also succinctly made in Judge Easterbrook's 
Foreword to Reading Law. Easterbrook, supra note 6, at xxi-xxvi. 
13. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting 
Statutes, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 845 (1992); James J. Brudney 8c Corey Ditslear, Canons of 
Construction and the Elusive Quest for Neutral Reasoning, 58 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 6 (2005) 
[hereinafter Brudney 8c Ditslear, Canons of Construction] (arguing accepted canons of 
construction do not constrain judges from imposing ideology in decisions); James J. 
Brudney & Corey Ditslear, The Decline and Fall of Legislative History?: Patterns of 
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most intense statutory debates—such as "discriminate" in civil rights 
laws—have a variety of meanings, choosing one meaning of a word is 
"like entering a crowded cocktail party and looking over the heads of the 
guests for one's friends."14 In practice, the Supreme Court and many 
lower courts have relied increasingly on dictionaries to escape this 
charge,15 but, as Scalia and Garner point out, dictionaries are no pana 
cea: Because there are so many of them and each offers a variety of defi 
nitions for common terms, dictionaries confirm or exacerbate the variety 
of choices rather than narrow them.16 In other words, cherry-picking 
among interpretive sources is a problem for all methodologies, and the 
new textualism offers no solution to this ancient dilemma. Indeed, the 
most illuminating analyses in Reading Law are those in which the authors 
engage both sides of a close debate and admit that textualist sources of 
fer no easy answers to some interpretive issues.17 
Nonetheless, Reading Law offers what its authors consider a partial 
solution to the problem of judicial discretion in statutory interpretation. 
The thesis of the book is that there are "valid canons"18 of statutory inter 
pretation and that if all judges followed these "valid canons" they would 
be more constrained and law would be more predictable. The meat of 
the book consists of these "valid canons" that, by Scalia and Garner's ac 
count, reflect "sound principles of interpretation"19: thirty-seven "princi 
ples applicable to all texts,"20 plus twenty "principles applicable specifi 
cally to governmental prescriptions" when judges interpret statutes,21 
plus thirteen "falsities exposed" by the authors.22 While the authors sug 
gest that their list may be as few as one-third of the total number of "valid 
Supreme Court Reliance in the Burger and Rehnquist Eras, 89 Judicature 220, 229 (2006) 
("Personal beliefs, policy preferences, and strategic considerations surely help shape the 
priority given to each interpretive resource."); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Textualism, the 
Unknown Ideal?, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 1509, 1535 (1998) (book review) [hereinafter Eskridge, 
Unknown Ideal] (arguing textualism does not "narrow[] the options of Scalia's bete noire, 
the willful judge"); Alan Schwartz, The New Textualism and the Rule of Law Subtext in 
the Supreme Court's Bankruptcy Jurisprudence, 45 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 149, 159 (2000) 
(claiming legislative history often provides reliable "evidentiary basis from which to infer 
legislative intent"). 
14. See supra note 10 and accompanying text. 
15. Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier 8c Samuel A. Thumma, Scaling the Lexicon Fortress: The 
United States Supreme Court's Use of Dictionaries in the Twenty-First Century, 94 Marq. 
L. Rev. 77, 103 (2010). 
16. See Scalia & Garner, supra note 2, at 419-24 (listing "most useful and authorita 
tive" dictionaries). 
17. See, e.g., id. at 158-60 (highlighting United States v. Hayes, 555 U.S. 415 (2009), 
as "example of how various canons of interpretation point to different outcomes"). 
18. Id. at 9. 
19. Id. at 47. 
20. Id. at 49-239 (describing canons 1-37). 
21. Id. at 241-339 (describing canons 38-57). 
22. Id. at 341-410 (describing "falsities" or anticanons 58-70). 
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canons," they are satisfied that following these rules will make judging 
"easier" (albeit not "easy").23 
This candid book is an effort to retrieve a culture of judicial restraint 
and objectivity through the mechanism of the nineteenth century's rule 
filled treatise.24 Quoting an 1882 treatise, for example, the authors say: 
"The sound view is that 'statutory interpretation is governed as absolutely 
by rules as anything else in law .... [0]n the whole, the rules of statutory 
interpretation are specially stable.'"25 The Langdellian culture of law as 
categories and bright-line rules has long departed, and the rule-based 
treatise cannot serve as the legisprudence for the new millennium. In 
deed, the treatise-based regime was never quite the "science" that Scalia 
and Garner suppose it to have been. Thus, in the early twentieth century, 
LochnerAovmg federal judges deployed the "stable," canons-based juris 
prudence of the old treatises for dynamic and highly partisan purposes, 
such as providing novel statutory weapons to employers seeking to de 
stroy labor unions.26 The New Deal buried this canons-based reaction to 
the worker-friendly regulatory state with a purpose-based approach to 
statutory interpretation.27 
Complementing its nostalgia for rule-based treatises, the conceptual 
agenda of the Scalia and Garner book seems to be largely a repetition of 
Justice Scalia's frequently expressed views about textual interpretation, 
the proper role of the judge, and the many reasons judges should not 
rely on legislative history. What is new about the book is its effort to set 
forth a collection of "valid canons" of statutory construction and to 
demonstrate that these valid canons will constrain judicial decisionmak 
ing in statutory cases. The authors do not succeed in this project. Indeed, 
23. Id. at xxviii. 
24. J.G. Sutherland's Statutes and Statutory Construction (Chicago, Callaghan 8c Co. 
1891) has long been our nation's leading collection of canons of statutory interpretation, 
with literally hundreds of them catalogued and illustrated. The most recent update, by 
Norman andJ.D. Shambie Singer, was completed in 2012. The Scalia and Garner book 
looks a lot like the original Sutherland treatise, before it became so lengthy, and shares its 
aspiration to recover a scientific set of rules for interpreting statutes (and other legal doc 
uments). Cf. Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 1, at 14-15 (expressing nostalgia for 
Sutherland and other nineteenth-century treatises that recognized "science of statutory 
interpretation"). 
25. Scalia 8c Garner, supra note 2, at 61 (alteration in original) (quotingjoel Prentiss 
Bishop, Commentaries on the Written Laws and Their Interpretation § 2, at 3 (Boston, 
Little, Brown, 8c Co. 1882)). 
26. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation 81-105 (1994) 
[hereinafter Eskridge, Dynamic] (documenting antiworker deployment of Lochner-era 
statutory interpretation by railroad-appointed judges, who imported their own pro-busi 
ness values into statutes through creative readings of text and deployment of canons such 
as rule against derogating from common law). 
27. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. 8c Philip P. Frickey, An Historical and Critical 
Introduction to Hart & Sacks, supra note 3, at li, lxviii-xcvi (providing historical account 
of purposive "turn" in statutory methodology in late 1930s, classically codified in Hart and 
Sacks's legal process materials of 1950s). 
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their exegesis of dozens of canons actually undermines the conceptual 
theses of the book and of Scalia's legisprudence.28 This Review will ex 
plore three big problems with the Scalia-Garner canons as a set of rules 
that constrain judges and implement original meaning, the Scalia-Garner 
metric. If I am right about these problems, the actual effect of the Scalia 
Garner canons would not be greater judicial restraint but instead a rela 
tively less constrained and somewhat more antidemocratic textualism. 
One problem is that even their fragmentary list of approved can 
ons29 reveals significant possibilities for judicial cherry-picking. In any 
complex case, there will be several canons on every side of the issue, and 
the unscrupulous judge will have many cherries to pick under the ap 
proach favored by Scalia and Garner. Recall that the authors admit that 
theirs is a fragmentary list of "valid canons" and that there might be three 
times as many valid canons of statutory construction,30 which is a rich or 
chard from which to pick cherries. Updated through 2012, my casebook 
coauthors and I found 187 different canons of statutory construction in 
the opinions of the Supreme Court under Chief Justices Rehnquist and 
Roberts.31 
Moreover, even the most scrupulous of judges will be tempted to 
pick some cherries when the case raises issues of large public moment, 
especially for judges who harbor strong moral feelings regarding those 
issues. To illustrate this phenomenon, this Review examines one of Scalia 
and Garner's favorite cases, Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Communities for 
a Great Oregon,32 More than a dozen Scalia and Garner-approved canons 
were relevant to judicial resolution of the statutory issue: Did the 
Department of the Interior have authority under section 9 of the 
Endangered Species Act (ESA) to prevent landowners from harming en 
dangered species by destroying their essential habitat?33 Both Justice 
28. The indeterminacy of the authors' canons-based methodology has been met with 
scorn by Judge Richard A. Posner. See Richard A. Posner, The Incoherence of Antonin 
Scalia, The New Republic (Aug. 24, 2012, 12:00 PM) (book review), 
http://www. tnr.com/article/magazine/books-and-arts/106441 /scalia-garner-reading-the 
law-textual-originalism (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (arguing general "pattern of 
equivocation exhibited throughout [the] book" and "authors' lack of a consistent com 
mitment to textual originalism" creates "problem that undermines their entire ap 
proach") . 
29. Scalia & Garner, supra note 2, at xi-xvi. 
30. See supra note 23 and accompanying text. 
31. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Elizabeth Garrett & James J. Brudney, Cases and 
Materials on Legislation: Statutes and the Creation of Public Policy app. (4th ed. Supp. 
2012). We do not represent that the number 187 includes all possible canons, only the 
ones we found for the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts. Consistent with Scalia and Garner's 
critique of Llewellyn, see infra note 49, and their own shorter collection, our collection 
includes canons and their caveats as one canon. 
32. 515 U.S. 687 (1995). Scalia and Garner devote several pages to the case and 
quote extensively from the dissenting opinion (authored by Scalia), which they like quite a 
lot. Scalia & Garner, supra note 2, at 230-33. 
33. 515 U.S. at 690. 
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John Paul Stevens, for the Court,34 and Justice Scalia, for the dissenters, 
were able to assemble an impressive array of canons. Reading their duel 
ing opinions, one is left with the impression that the deployment of can 
ons by both distinguished jurists was a ritualized display masking dueling 
results that were driven by deeper institutional and even normative prin 
ciples. 
Thus, a related issue is what I call the norms problem. The cherry 
picking problem suggests that judges who feel strongly about the issues 
in a case will have plenty of canons to choose from to support the process 
of reading their political preferences into statutes. The norms problem 
suggests that the canons themselves demand normative analysis and, 
therefore, discretionary choices on the part of judges. Among the 187 
canons that my coauthors and I found for the Rehnquist and Roberts 
Courts, at least 134 canons (or 71.7%) are "substantive."35 Substantive 
canons are presumptions, clear statement rules, or even super-strong 
clear statement rules that reflect judicial value judgments drawn from the 
common law and from constitutional law (created by judges), as well as 
from statutes themselves (as understood and interpreted by judges). 
Although Justice Scalia signed onto almost all of the opinions recogniz 
ing or relying on these substantive canons, Scalia and Garner offer nei 
ther endorsement nor critique for as many as 120 of these substantive 
canons. They do sign onto the best known of the substantive canons, 
namely, the rule to seek interpretations that avoid serious constitutional 
questions36 and the purpose canon favoring interpretations that advance 
rather than obstruct a statute's goal.37 What is most interesting is that 
Scalia and Garner's more comprehensive discussion of the textual can 
ons38 demonstrates several ways in which a judge's application of those 
canons depends, critically, on normative judicial judgments about statu 
tory purpose. 
Thus, statutory purpose looms large in the canons validated by Scalia 
and Garner—yet their hefty treatise (weighing in at more than 500 
pages) offers virtually nothing useful to guide an interpreter who needs 
34. Justice Stevens is one of the great statutory interpreters in the Supreme Court's 
history, and he and Justice Scalia have been dueling judges in a series of classic debates 
within the Court (with Sweet Home being their greatest debate). In a moment that wonder 
fully combines cogent legal analysis with professional graciousness, Scalia and Garner tip 
their hats to Justice Stevens at the beginning of their book, by providing a cogent defense 
of a Stevens dissent in a little-known case arising under the Flood Control Act. Scalia Sc 
Garner, supra note 2, at 1-3, 44-46. 
35. This count is perhaps conservative, because it was limited to the canons we label 
"substantive" plus the "continuity" canons. Counting from the canons assembled in the 
fourth edition of the casebook, Professor Brudney counted 79% as substantive. James J. 
Brudney, Canon Shortfalls and the Virtues of Political Branch Interpretive Assets, 98 Calif. 
L. Rev. 1199, 1206 (2010) [hereinafter Brudney, Canon Shortfalls]. 
36. Scalia 8c Garner, supra note 2, at 247-51. 
37. Id. at 63-65. 
38. Id. at 167-239. 
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to figure out statutory purpose. To say, as Scalia and Garner do, that 
judges can deduce purpose from text risks circularity: The point of a 
purpose inquiry is to figure out how to construe an ambiguous or vague 
text, and the ambiguity of text will be replicated in an ambiguity (or a 
plurality) of purpose. Why not examine legislative history, which usually 
reveals a fair amount of consensus about what problems the statute was 
supposed to solve, what tradeoffs legislators were willing to make, and 
how far they were willing to go in solving the problem?39 The most 
prominent examples of text-based discernments of purpose offered in 
Reading Law strike me as unpersuasive and, if anything, reinforce the im 
pression that strict textualism is not particularly constraining. 
Finally, there is a democracy problem with a canons-based textual 
ism. If the canons overwhelmingly reflect judicial values and not legisla 
tive ones, they can be expected to operate in antidemocratic ways, espe 
cially if this Review is right about the cherry-picking and norms prob 
lems. The democracy problem is exacerbated if canons-toting judges 
overturn agency interpretations that are consistent with Congress's ex 
pectations, which is what Justice Scalia was trying to do in Sweet Home. 
And the democracy problem becomes a serious indictment if judges are 
imposing canons-based meanings onto statutes under circumstances 
where Congress is not aware of the canons judges are using or is unable 
to incorporate canonical rules into statutory drafting, given the condi 
tions of the legislative process. 
The democracy problem is not without remedy. As federal judges 
realized in the 1930s, the most obvious remedy to the democracy prob 
lem would be to give priority to the ordinary meaning of statutory lan 
39. Scalia and Garner also set forth various constitutional and practical objections to 
the use of legislative history. See id. at 375-87 (arguing that legislative "intent" is worthless 
fiction, legislative materials are unreliable evidence of any conceivable intent, and treating 
materials generated by legislative subgroups as "authoritative" raises separation of powers 
concerns). For responses to these various arguments, see Lawrence M. Solan, The 
Language of Statutes: Laws and Their Interpretation 82-119 (2010) [hereinafter Solan, 
Language] (responding to argument that "legislative intent" is worthless fiction); Brudney 
& Ditslear, Canons of Construction, supra note 13, at 15-29 (responding to argument that 
legislative history enables judges to ignore rule of law, while textual canons constrain 
judges); James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretation of 
Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 41-56 (1994) [hereinafter 
Brudney, Chatter] (responding to argument that reliance on legislative materials under 
mines separation of powers or typically rests upon phony legislative history); Eskridge, 
New Textualism, supra note 1, at 673-76 (responding to separation of powers arguments 
for excluding legislative history). See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Frills 
Textualism, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 2041 (2006) (reviewing Adrian Vermeule, Judging Under 
Uncertainty (2006)) (responding to argument that judges are experts at textual interpre 
tation and incompetent or sneaky in using legislative history); Victoria Nourse, 
Misunderstanding Congress: Statutory Interpretation, the Supermajoritarian Difficulty, 
and the Separation of Powers, 99 Geo. L.J. 1119 (2011) (responding to separation of pow 
ers arguments for excluding legislative history and, indeed, turning those arguments 
around to favor legislative history). 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.101 on Tue, 8 Apr 2014 00:20:55 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
2013] NEW TEXTUALISM AND NORMATIVE CANONS 539 
guage, understood in the context of legislative history and purpose, be 
fore applying the judicial canons.40 Professor James Brudney suggests 
that "judges who regularly rely on the canons have license to employ a 
systemic kind of discretion, in contrast to judges who regularly invoke 
legislative history or agency deference."41 Brudney worries about "this 
systemic discretion, especially given the efforts of some judges and schol 
ars to enshrine the canons as an institutionally objective interpretive as 
set," and argues that "[r]ather than enshrine them, we ought to limit the 
untethered role played by the canons, making them interstitial in com 
parison to the more anchored interpretive assets."42 
This is not the remedy suggested by Scalia and Garner, though they 
do concede that looking to legislative history is permissible "for the pur 
pose of establishing linguistic usage,"43 which should extend to include 
clues about the structure of the statute and the way words and phrases fit 
together. This is a potentially broad ambit for consideration of legislative 
history—and indeed this is the argument one hears for why original 
meaning lawyers and judges consider The Federalist Papers (propaganda 
documents seeking to influence state ratification debates) when inter 
preting the Constitution. For the same reasons The Federalist Papers are 
useful as aids to figure out what the words of the Constitution mean and 
what purposes they serve, so committee reports and sponsors' statements 
are useful as aids to figure out what statutory words mean and what pur 
poses they serve.44 
Notwithstanding the foregoing concerns, Scalia and Garner assume 
that there is no democracy problem for judges to rely on judge-gener 
ated canons of construction while largely ignoring legislator-generated 
legislative history. They think that almost all the "valid canons" are ones 
that anyone having common sense (generously including members of 
Congress) would recognize and follow. Yet they produce not one scintilla 
40. Some textualists maintain that legislative history is just too complicated and tricky 
for judges to handle. See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Judging Under Uncertainty 107-17 
(2006) (arguing volume and heterogeneity of legislative history increase risk of judicial 
error). However, no textualist has ever demonstrated, with empirical evidence or even a 
review of important cases, that federal judges are unable to deal with legislative materials. 
Moreover, legal scholars with legislative experience and acumen are providing judges with 
useful guides. See, e.g., Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of Statutory Interpretation: 
Legislative History by the Rules, 122 Yale L.J. 70, 90-134 (2012) [hereinelfter Nourse, 
Rules] (providing five principles for interpreting legislative history). 
41. Brudney, Canon Shortfalls, supra note 35, at 1231-32. 
42. Id. 
43. Scalia & Garner, supra note 2, at 388. 
44. I have suggested some possible reasons why original-meaning judges might look 
at The Federalist in constitutional cases, while ignoring legislative history in statutory cases. 
See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Should the Supreme Court Read The Federalist but 
Not Statutory Legislative History?, 66 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1301 (1998). While there are 
plausible reasons to treat these sources differently, I remain persuaded that legislative 
history is relevant and useful for statutory interpreters. 
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of evidence that this is the case—and there is now strong evidence that it 
is not, as will be demonstrated in Part III. Specifically, the "valid canons," 
from a legislative point of view, are not the text-based canons lauded by 
Scalia and Garner, but are instead the canons that Scalia and Garner as 
sociate with unacceptable purposive, pragmatic, or dynamic interpreta 
tions. 
This Review will conclude with some observations about the validity 
of the canons and the Supreme Court's practice in statutory cases such as 
Sweet Home. A central problem with Reading Law is that it advances a pro 
posed regime of canons that promises to make statutory interpretation 
more predictable, but without any evidence that its regime would have 
that effect (and increasing evidence that it would not). Implicitly, the 
authors believe that some of the canons can be defended by democratic 
and substantive reasoning but fail to integrate the potpourri of normative 
justifications into a systematic defense of the canons they support. In 
deed, one might come away from reading their book with the view, pre 
viously advanced by Justice Scalia in his Tanner Lectures at Princeton 
University, that the textual canons are "commonsensical" and rather 
harmless and that most of the other canons are "a lot of trouble" for the 
"honest textualist."45 
The most problematic feature of Reading Law is its lack of apprecia 
tion for the virtues of the Court's pragmatic approach to statutory inter 
pretation. Contrary to Scalia and Garner, the Court's practice is not fairly 
characterized as "confusion" worse confounded.46 Since the New Deal, 
the Supreme Court has followed a pragmatic approach that can easily be 
identified and understood. (Indeed, Justice Scalia's excellent dissent in 
Sweet Home follows the Court's pragmatic approach,47 and that gives his 
dissent much of its cogency.) The pragmatic approach can also be un 
derstood through the lens of the canons, but requires a much broader 
understanding of the canons than that offered in Reading Law. 
I. Cherry-Picking Problems with the New Canons-Based Textualism 
One of the fundamental principles of statutory interpretation, ac 
cording to Scalia and Garner, is this: "No canon of interpretation is abso 
lute. Each may be overcome by the strength of differing principles that 
point in other directions."48 Such a candid, and correct, statement poses 
problems for a canons-based methodology that promises relative deter 
minacy. Indeed, the most famous American law review article ever pub 
45. Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 1, at 25-29. 
46. Scalia 8c Garner, supra note 2, at 9-15. 
47 See infra notes 96, 119, 168-183 and accompanying text (providing examples of 
extratextual normative, ideological, and statutory influence in Sweet Home dissent). 
48. Scalia 8c Garner, supra note 2, at 59. 
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lished on statutory interpretation is Karl Llewellyn's mischievous demon 
stration that "there are two opposing canons on almost every point."49 
Scalia and Garner respond to Llewellyn's witty display: Some of the 
canons mentioned by Llewellyn are controversial, and most of the pairs 
on Llewellyn's canon-countercanon list consist of rules with their caveats 
or exceptions.50 But these astute responses raise questions of their own 
and, ultimately, do not answer Llewellyn's essential point, which is that 
the canons are not very constraining. Indeed, Scalia and Garner's book 
itself demonstrates new ways that canons do not constrain. 
That is, the book makes clear that there are several preliminary 
questions that must be posed about the canons, and each inquiry reveals 
the manipulability of the canons. First, what canons are "valid"? Different 
interpreters will provide different answers to this question, and "valid" 
canons will change over time. Second, how does the judge apply the can 
ons? Part II will demonstrate that judges cannot apply most of the "valid 
canons" without making normative judgments. Third, how does the 
judge handle competing or cross-cutting canons? Because there are so 
many canons, hard cases will offer the opportunistic or opinionated 
judge plenty of opportunities for cherry-picking. 
A. What Rules Are "Canonical"? 
There are a lot of potential canons: The Supreme Court follows as 
many as 187.51 A small number of the canons are controversial within the 
Court, but among those that are not particularly controversial are various 
canons that direct judges to consider relevant committee reports and 
other legislative history to resolve statutory ambiguities. Yet Scalia and 
Garner consider these to be "anticanons" rather than canons from a tex 
tualist point of view.52 This may be confusing for practitioners, who must 
be attentive to the majority practice, indeed to a practice that is almost 
unanimous within the Supreme Court. Thus, the lawyer who faithfully 
follows the Scalia and Garner book would be committing legal malprac 
tice in those cases where there is relevant legislative history that almost all 
federal judges and eight (and sometimes nine) of nine Supreme Court 
Justices would consider before rendering a final answer in a statutory 
case. 
49. Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or 
Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 Vand. L. Rev. 395, 401 (1950). 
Llewellyn followed up that assertion with a two-columned table, pitting one canon after 
another with its opposite. Id. at 401-06. 
50. See Scalia & Garner, supra note 2, at 59-60 (describing some of Llewellyn's can 
ons as "silly," "not canons of interpretation," or "not contradictions at all"). 
51 See supra note 31 and accompanying text (discussing study of canons in Court 
opinions). 
52. See Scalia & Garner, supra note 2, at 59 & n.3 (describing nontextual, meaning 
and purpose-based canons as "anticanons"); see also id. at 369-90 (attacking "false notion 
that committee reports and floor speeches are worthwhile aids in statutory construction"). 
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This raises an important point. Reading Law is a normative book and 
not a descriptive one.53 Because the authors denigrate various legislative 
history canons that are commonly invoked by judges and favor some 
canons that remain controversial, they are not describing current federal 
practice. Indeed, Reading Law does not include analysis of critically im 
portant canons that the authors themselves endorse, namely, the prece 
dent-based canons. Together with the plain meaning rule,54 the most im 
portant canon of statutory interpretation is the stare decisis canon: When 
applying statutory text to new cases, courts must consider their own prec 
edents, which are to be followed when on point and whose reasoning 
and even dicta are guides from which judges should reason.55 On the 
whole, the Supreme Court spends as much or more time analyzing its 
own statutory precedents as it does analyzing statutory texts,56 and the 
Justices' decisions in antitrust and many other kinds of cases usually start 
with application of precedent and do not even quote the statutory text.57 
Almost as important are the various canons requiring judges to defer to 
agency interpretations of statutes. Scalia and Garner have no quarrel with 
these precedent-based canons58 but do not incorporate them into their 
analysis.59 For this reason, Reading Law provides an incomplete 
understanding of how statutory interpretation is done in the large major 
ity of difficult cases. 
And for cases that do not involve judicial or agency precedent, 
Reading Law offers only a normative theory of what the canons "ought" to 
include, from a textualist perspective.60 This is another important feature 
of their book, and one that renders their approach potentially quite dy 
namic: A judge (like Scalia) interpreting statutory texts needs to figure 
out which canons are "valid" ones—and canons "valid" in one era may 
53. See id. at 9 ("Our approach is unapologetically normative, prescribing what, in 
our view, courts ought to do with operative language."). 
54. The plain (or ordinary) meaning rule holds that "[w]ords are to be understood 
in their ordinary, everyday meanings—unless the context indicates that they bear a tech 
nical sense." Id. at 69-77. 
55. Id. at 41. 
56. Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation: An 
Empirical Analysis, 70 Tex. L. Rev. 1073, 1093 (1992) (reporting that, in statutory inter 
pretation cases from 1890 to 1990, Supreme Court cited and relied on precedent more 
often than any other authority, including text). 
57. See Miranda McGowan, Do as I Do, Not as I Say: An Empirical Investigation of 
Justice Scalia's Ordinary Meaning Method of Statutory Interpretation, 78 Miss. L.J. 129, 
164 (2008) (noting Court "has traditionally interpreted" antitrust, habeas corpus, and 
§ 1983 statutes "in a common law fashion"). This is an important reason why Justice Scalia 
himself neglects statutory text in a large percentage of cases. See id. (observing Justice 
Scalia follows case law in "common law" statutory cases). 
58. Scalia & Garner, supra note 2, at 411-14. 
59. Id. at 41 ("Our advice in this treatise . . . pertains only to what a court ought to do 
when it is free to interpret a text on its own. When an ideological question of interpreta 
tion has previously been resolved . . . stare decisis renders [it] irrelevant. . . ."). 
60. Id. at 9. 
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become "invalid" in the next. This is not only a dynamic textualism, but a 
potentially unfair approach to statutory interpretation. Congress has 
been legislating for decades under the assumptions of canons that Scalia 
and Garner would refuse to apply, such as the canons presuming the rel 
evance of committee reports and sponsor statements to resolve textual 
ambiguities61 or to confirm statutory plain meanings.62 To change the 
rules on which Congress had plausibly relied when it adopted statutes is 
far from a methodology that tries to recapture the original meaning of 
statutory language, Scalia and Garner's stated goal. 
Moreover, it is not always clear what justifies the canons that Scalia 
and Garner consider valid. The textualist perspective lends little or no 
support to many of the canons that are included in the book. For exam 
ple, canon 38 in the Scalia and Garner list is the rule that judges should 
avoid interpretations that would "raise serious questions of constitution 
ality" about a statute.63 In other words, an interpretation suggested by the 
statutory text would not be the stopping point and could be displaced by 
a less plausible reading of the text if the likely meaning would raise con 
stitutional questions that the interpreter thought "serious."64 This is not 
quite a "textualist" canon, and the authors admit as much. They defend it 
as a means of avoiding needless confrontations between the Court and 
Congress.65 That defense is appealing, but that is also a reason for the 
Court to heed legislative history, including subsequent legislative history, 
and other interpretive moves the authors abhor.66 
61. See, e.g., Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1937 (2011) (quoting House Report 
supplying judicial standard for ordering prison population caps); Rumsfeld v. Forum 
for Academic & Inst. Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 54 (2006) (citing House Report clari 
fying statute at issue in response to lower court ruling); United Steelworkers v. 
Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 206-07 (1979) (citing statement of sponsor of statute that par 
ticular provision was intended to affect interpretation of statute); Church of the 
Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 464-65 (1892) (citing Senate Committee 
Report explaining Committee's understanding of statute at issue). 
62. See, e.g., Carr v. United States, 130 S. Ct. 2229, 2241-42 (2010) (citing 
House Judiciary Committee Report to support nonretroactive construction of stat 
ute); Shinseki v. Sanders, 556 U.S. 396, 406-07 (2009) (using Senate Report to clar 
ify legislative definition of prejudicial error); United States v. Ressam, 553 U.S. 272, 
275-77 (2008) (reviewing differences in legislative history between firearms statute and 
explosives statute to interpret the latter); TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 176-84 (1978) (citing 
House, Senate, and Conference Reports to support strict reading of Endangered Species 
Act). 
63. Scalia & Garner, supra note 2, at 247-48. 
64. For an excellent treatment of the avoidance canon, see generally Trevor W. 
Morrison, Constitutional Avoidance in the Executive Branch, 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1189 
(2006). 
65. Scalia & Garner, supra note 2, at 249. 
66. See generally Brudney, Chatter, supra note 39 (arguing Court should use legisla 
tive history to prevent cost to Congress of overriding Court's decisions); cf. Brudney, 
Canon Shortfalls, supra note 35, at 1218-24 (arguing Constitution's Journal Clauses and 
early congressional practice establish superiority of public legislative materials over judi 
cially generated canons, as matter of original constitutional meaning). 
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Relatedly, Scalia and Garner endorse the absurdity canon: "A provi 
sion may be either disregarded or judicially corrected as an error (when 
the correction is textually simple) if failing to do so would result in a dis 
position that no reasonable person could approve."67 It is hard to see 
how this canon is consistent with textualism; a dyed-in-the-wool textualist 
would apply statutes as written and perhaps strike them down if they are 
really beyond all reason. The absurdity canon is more consistent with a 
purposivist approach, which understands statutory text through the lens 
of legislative expectations.68 Leading academic textualists agree with this 
evaluation,69 yet Justice Scalia himself has stuck with the canon and in a 
recent case applied it more aggressively than would any purposivist now 
on the Court.70 Objecting to his colleagues' text-based application of a 
prisoner litigation statute to uphold a three judge court judgment direct 
ing a state to release prisoners if it did not solve the problem of unconsti 
tutional overcrowding, Justice Scalia opined that judges should "bend 
every effort to read the law in such a way as to avoid that outrageous re 
sult."71 The result of a simple application of the statutory text was "outra 
geous" to Justice Scalia but not to five of his colleagues, not to a unani 
mous three judge court below, and not to me, for that matter. Indeed, 
what eight federal judges thought was constitutionally required, four 
judges said was "absurd," "outrageous," and a "travesty" (Justice Scalia's 
language).72 The ease with which Justice Scalia's normative outrage 
dominated the apparent plain meaning of the law suggests the dangers, 
from a purely textualist theory, of the absurd results exception to the 
plain meaning rule. 
The cherry-picking problem with the canons is a deep one, once one 
realizes there is this important preliminary question: What canons are 
canonical? There is no canonical collection of valid canons, and the 
Scalia and Garner book does not come close to filling that gap. Without a 
canonical collection, there is a great danger of making up the canons as 
you go along. Under such circumstances, using the canons is like inviting 
only your friends to a cocktail party and then picking out those friends 
who best serve your purposes on this particular occasion. 
67. Scalia & Garner, supra note 2, at 234-39. 
68. See Eskridge, Unknown Ideal, supra note 13, at 1549 (criticizing new textualism 
for this inconsistency); cf. Jane S. Schacter, Text or Consequences?, 76 Brook. L. Rev. 
1007, 1011 (2011) [hereinafter Schacter, Consequences] (demonstrating Justice Scalia is 
thoroughly normative in statutory interpretation and repeatedly demands that judges 
avoid absurd or even unreasonable interpretations). 
69. See, e.g., John F. Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 2387, 2392 
(2003) (urging textualists to abandon absurd results canon); John C. Nagle, Textualism's 
Exceptions, Issues in Legal Scholarship, Dec. 2002, art. 15, available at 
http://www.degruyter.eom/view/j/ils.2002.2.issue 
2/ils.2002.2.2.1035/ils.2002.2.2.1035.xml (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (same). 
70. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1950 (2011) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
71. Id. at 1950-51. 
72. Id. 
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B. How Does the Interpreter Handle Competing Canons ? 
Assume that the "valid canons" are not open to speculation. Will the 
canonical canons provide greater determinacy for statutory interpreta 
tion? Return to the Llewellyn critique that for every canon there is a 
countercanon.73 Scalia and Garner have a good answer, that most of 
Llewellyn's examples involve a canon and caveats or exceptions to the 
canon. But their answer begs the better question. In most cases involving 
any interpretive difficulty, the cherry-picking problem is not going to be 
that there is a canon on one side and a countercanon on the other; in 
stead, the problem will be that there are a dozen or more canons that are 
applicable to the issue and they will push the interpreter in cross-cutting 
ways. The plethora of cross-cutting canons invites cherry-picking. 
Consider Sweet Home.74 Section 9(a)(1)(B) of the Endangered 
Species Act makes it an offense for any person to "take any [endangered] 
species within the United States or the territorial sea of the United 
States."75 Section 3(19) of the Act defines the statutory term: "The term 
'take' means to harass, harm, pursue, hunt, shoot, wound, kill, trap, cap 
ture, or collect, or to attempt to engage in any such conduct."76 The 
Department of the Interior's 1975 regulation, as revised in 1981, defines 
"harm" in the statutory definition of "take" as any activity that "actually 
kills or injures" endangered species, including an activity that results in 
"significant habitat modification or degradation . . . [that] significantly 
impair [s] essential behavioral patterns, including breeding, feeding or 
sheltering."77 Under that definition of harm, private landowners that dis 
rupt breeding patterns by destroying a significant habitat for an endan 
gered species are in violation of section 9(a) (1) (B). 
In 1995, the Supreme Court considered the validity of the 
Department's regulation. In dissent, Justice Scalia said the Department's 
rule was outside of the statute's plain meaning, while Justice Stevens 
wrote for the Court, finding the regulation within the statute's plain 
meaning. There were more than a dozen cross-cutting Scalia and Garner 
approved canons available for the Justices, and they deployed them like 
battlefield weapons. Thus, Justice Scalia maintained that "take" as a mat 
ter of both common law and ordinary meaning involves aggressive activ 
ity targeted at a particular animal78—but Justice Stevens responded that 
ordinary and common-law meanings are superseded when Congress has 
73. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (discussing Llewellyn's dueling can 
ons). 
74. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995). 
75. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (2006) (emphasis added). 
76. Id. § 1532(19). 
77. Reclassification of the American Alligator and Other Amendments, 40 Fed. Reg. 
44,412, 44,416 (Sept. 26, 1975), as amended at 46 Fed. Reg. 54,748, 54,750 (Nov. 4, 1981), 
and codified at 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1994) (defining terms of ESA regulations). 
78. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 717-18 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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specifically defined the term to include any kind of "harm," the ordinary 
meaning of "harm" supported the Department.79 Justice Scalia countered 
with a caveat that congressional definitions should be read narrowly 
when they are in derogation of established meanings and with an argu 
ment that "harm" should be read to be similar to the other "action" verbs 
in the definition (i.e., the other verbs entailed action targeting specific 
animals) .80 Justice Stevens parried that such a narrow reading of "harm" 
would render it statutory surplusage, because a narrow reading of harm 
would simply duplicate the coverage of the other categories (trap, 
wound, harass, etc.).81 Moreover, Justice Stevens maintained that his 
reading of "take"/"harm" was consistent with the statutory purpose of 
protecting habitats for endangered species,82 which Justice Scalia coun 
tered with the rule of lenity: Given potential criminal prosecution for 
taking an endangered species, any ambiguity should be resolved against 
the government.83 
Finally, both sides relied on the whole act rule, the precept that an 
interpretation more consistent with the other provisions of a statute 
should (all else being roughly equal) be preferred to an interpretation 
less consistent with the remainder of the statute. Justice Scalia argued 
that his narrow understanding of "take" is more consistent with the way 
that precise term is used elsewhere in both the ESA and in other stat 
utes.84 Moreover, he maintained that his interpretation fits better with 
the structure of the statute, which gives the federal government eminent 
domain and restricted use rules as the statute's response to preserving 
habitat and imposes on private parties only obligations not to wound, 
kill, etc. endangered species.85 In response, Justice Stevens pointed to 
legislative history contemplating that the anti-take provision of the en 
dangered species bill would regulate habitat destruction by private par 
ties and pointed out that section 10 of the ESA (as expanded by Congress 
in 1982) built upon, and implicitly ratified, the Department's interpreta 
tion.86 
79. Id. at 697-98 & n.10 (majority opinion) (invoking interpretive direction canon 
and ordinary meaning canon for definitional term "harm"). 
80. Id. at 719-20 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (invoking associated words canon). 
81. Id. at 697-98 (majority opinion) (invoking canon against surplusage). 
82. Id. (invoking canon against ineffectiveness). 
83. Id. at 721-22 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (invoking rule of lenity to trump statutory 
purpose in case of ambiguity). 
84. Id. at 722-23 (invoking presumption of consistent usage). 
85. Id. at 723-24 (invoking whole act canon). 
86. Id. at 700-01 (majority opinion) (invoking whole act canon and noting Congress 
was relying on Department's interpretation of "harm" when it added administrative pro 
cess providing relief for farmers and ranchers whose projects would incidentally harm 
habitat of endangered species). Congress also relied on the Department's understanding 
when it amended the law in 1978. Id. at 703 n.17. 
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Even this simplified summary of the debate between the Justices re 
veals that a great many of Scalia and Garner's "valid canons" were availa 
ble to each Justice. Just as if he was picking out friends from the crowd at 
a cocktail party, each Justice picked out friendly canons from the crowd 
of applicable rules and principles. Limited to the Scalia and Garner list 
ing of "valid canons," the table below reveals how cross-cutting the can 
ons were in that case. 
Canons Invoked by Justice Stevens Canons Invoked by Justice Scalia 
Interpretive direction canon (225) Ordinary meaning canon (69) 
Ordinary meaning canon for definitional 
term (69) 
Canon of imputed common-law meaning 
(320) 
Surplusage canon (174) Associated words canon (195) 
Presumption against ineffectiveness (63) Presumption against ineffectiveness caveat 
(63) 
Rule of lenity (296) 
Whole text canon (167) Whole text canon (167) 
Presumption of consistent usage (170) 
Material variation canon (170) 
The numbers enclosed in parentheses indicate the pages in Reading Law where 
the particular canons are discussed. 
Note that the table understates the matter. In addition to the forego 
ing canons, all of which are found in Reading Law, other canons that 
Justice Scalia himself endorses were relevant, especially the precedent 
based canons. Thus, Justice Stevens relied on the GhevrorF deference 
idea that any reasonable construction of the statute was permissible for 
the agency, and on various legislative history canons (to which Justice 
Scalia generally objects).88 Moreover, Justice Stevens relied on language 
and reasoning from an earlier Supreme Court precedent, TV A v. Hill, the 
famous Snail Darter Case, that supported his approach to the statute.89 
Although Justice Scalia believes that his array of canons-based rea 
soning is clearly superior to that of Justice Stevens, his claim is unpersua 
sive. Because the agency's interpretation was entitled to Chevron defer 
ence, a finding of ambiguity would have tilted in favor of the agency. 
Given the many arguments both ways, it is hard to see how there is a sin 
gle plain meaning that trumped the agency's interpretation. Even limit 
87. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 845 (1984). 
For further discussion of Chevron deference, see infra notes 167, 250 and accompanying 
text. 
88. Id. at 703-08 (relying on Chevron canon and various legislative history canons). 
89. Id. at 698-99 (relying on TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1976)). 
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ing one's attention to what Scalia and Garner consider the "valid can 
ons,"90 it is hard to see how their pure textualism creates more 
predictability and determinacy in the law, or how it will likely constrain 
judges. 
C. The Constant Temptation to Fudge 
Scalia and Garner are probably right to say that judges have a 
"tendency ... to imbue authoritative legal texts with their policy 
preferences,"91 but there is no evidence that the new textualism in any 
way ameliorates that tendency or constrains judges any more than other 
methodologies. In Sweet Home, Justice Scalia cheriy-picked from diction 
aries,92 the common law,93 and even statutory structure94 to assail the 
Court's view that the explicit and broad statutory definition ("harm" to 
endangered species) covers the agency's rule. In doing so, however, 
Justice Scalia ignored his and Garner's admonition that "general terms 
are to be given their general meaning" and not cramped by judicially 
created exceptions or narrow readings.95 Why was Justice Scalia so sure 
the agency was wrong in Sweet Home} The canonical arguments strike me 
as cutting both ways. 
The language used injustice Scalia's Sweet Home dissent suggests that 
he was doing something more than neutrally applying textualist canons. 
Thus, he opened his dissenting opinion not with a defense of the plain 
meaning rule or an objection to the legitimacy of the agency's dynamic 
interpretation of the 1973 Act, but with this normative cri de coeur: "The 
Court's holding that the hunting and killing prohibition incidentally 
preserves habitat on private lands imposes unfairness to the point of fi 
nancial ruin—not just upon the rich, but upon the simplest farmer who 
finds his land conscripted to national zoological use."96 An underlying theme 
that runs through the dissenting opinion is the idea that federal statutes 
ought to be construed to present as little interference as possible with the 
common law of property. Thus, Justice Scalia anchored his entire linguis 
tic argument on the Pierson v. Posf understanding that "taking" an ani 
mal is a targeted violent act such as catching varmints in a trap and can 
90. Scalia & Garner, supra note 2, at xxix. 
91. Id. atxxviii. 
92. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 719 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing variety of dictionaries to 
argue "harm" has "a range of meaning"). 
93. Id. at 718-19 (relying on common law definition of "take" to argue it runs con 
trary to majority's interpretation). 
94. Id. at 722-24 (arguing majority's interpretation of "harm" is inconsistent with the 
other provisions and overall structure of ESA). 
95. Scalia & Garner, supra note 2, at 101. 
96. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 714 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
97. 3 Cai. 175 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1805) (ruling mere pursuit of fox did not establish fox 
had been "taken" by pursuer). 
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not be an untargeted nonviolent act such as draining a swamp.98 The 
opinion bristles with outrage that the federal government is telling "the 
simplest farmer" how to run his enterprise and reads into the ESA a pol 
icy that demands the government, if it wants to "conscript" private prop 
erty for "national zoological use," invoke its eminent domain authority to 
take the land and compensate those "simplest farmers" as conservatives 
think the Fifth Amendment requires for intrusive regulations. If Sir 
William Blackstone had been exhumed from the grave and briefed on 
the issue in Sweet Home, he would have been eager to join this dissenting 
opinion. 
That the Court's most conservative, land-protecting Republican 
Justices (Scalia, Thomas, Rehnquist) all joined a dissenting opinion pro 
tecting "the simplest farmer" against "conscription] to national zoologi 
cal use" (i.e., oppressive socialism) suggests that those Justices were de 
ploying canons to imbue authoritative legal texts with their policy prefer 
ences. In practice, therefore, the canonical approach revealed in Justice 
Scalia's Sweet Home dissent can be more of a normative than a neutral ap 
plication of the rule of law. 
Can this impression be generalized? Scalia and Garner are certain it 
cannot: "If pure textualism were a technique for achieving ideological 
ends, your authors would be counted extraordinarily inept at it."99 And 
they mention a number of cases where Justice Scalia voted for "liberal" 
results that he surely did not like as a political matter.100 But recall that 
he and Garner do not accuse judges of always voting ideologically; they 
simply have a tendency to do so.101 As Professors Miranda McGowan and 
Jane Schacter have demonstrated, in separate examinations of his opin 
ions, that is true of Justice Scalia—presumably not as a matter of strategy, 
but instead as a matter of unconsciously importing Blackstonian (liber 
tarian, property-protecting, and pro-business) values into choices about 
which canons to follow and how to argue them.102 
Consider an empirical study. Lauren Baer and I collected and ana 
lyzed 1,014 Supreme Court opinions between 1984 and 2006 where a 
98. See Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 720 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing "[e]ven 'taking' 
activities in the narrowest sense, activities traditionally engaged in by hunters and trappers, 
do not all consist of direct applications of force" and therefore stripping "harm" of re 
quirement of "direct force" is incorrect). 
99. Scalia 8c Garner, supra note 2, at 17. 
100. Id. (citing six cases in which Justice Scalia voted for "liberal" results using his 
new-textualist approach). 
101. Id. atxxviii. 
102. See McGowan, supra note 57, at 188 (concluding Justice Scalia "consults an 
eclectic set of extrinsic materials when construing statutes"); Schacter, Consequences, 
supra note 68, at 1010-12 (notingjustice Scalia's textualism "accepts and accommodates a 
number of canons that can be, and have been, deployed in consequentialist fashion"). 
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federal agency statutory interpretation was offered to the Justices.103 Even 
including criminal law cases where the rule of lenity augurs against the 
government, the agency interpretation prevailed more than two-thirds of 
the time, an amazing level of sustained success. We analyzed each 
Justice's voting pattern, including a comparison of how the political va 
lence (liberal versus conservative) of the agency interpretation correlated 
with the votes of each Justice. If he were following a completely neutral 
approach to discerning statutory meaning, one would expect Justice 
Scalia to vote for liberal agency interpretations at about the same rate as 
conservative ones.104 
Yet that is not what we found. When an agency interpretation was 
liberal, Justice Scalia went along with it 53.8% of the time, certainly an 
impressive display of neutrality—but one that pales in comparison to the 
71.6% win rate when agency interpretations were conservative.105 In con 
trast, Justice Breyer, a liberal who is the Court's best representative of a 
pragmatic or purposivist approach, voted to uphold conservative agency 
interpretations 64.9% of the time and liberal interpretations an even 
more impressive 79.5% of the time.106 It is notable that the conservative 
liberal ideology differential for Breyer is negative 14.6%, somewhat less 
than Scalia's differential of plus 17.8%. The contrast is more striking be 
tween the current Court's other leading textualist (Justice Thomas) and 
purposivist (Justice Ginsburg). Ginsburg's conservative-liberal differential 
is negative 16.8%, about the same level of difference as Scalia's (albeit in 
the opposite direction), but Thomas's is plus 29.0%, an astounding mar 
gin for a judge supposedly "constrained" by the textualist methodol 
ogy.107 
The data in the Eskridge and Baer study support Scalia and Garner's 
view that all judges (Breyer and Ginsburg as well as Scalia and Thomas) 
have a "tendency" to favor their own political preferences in statutory 
interpretation. However, I would add that Justices tend to be more mer 
ciful and generous when evaluating agency interpretations they sympa 
103. William N. Eskridge, Jr. 8c Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: 
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 
96 Geo. L.J. 1083 (2008). 
104. This would not be the case if there were selection biases that brought to the 
Court cases where "liberal" agency interpretations were legally weaker than "conservative" 
ones—but there is no reason to believe this to have been the case. Indeed, for 15 of the 23 
years covered by the survey (i.e., 1984-1992 and 2001-2006), agency interpretations were 
delivered to the Court by Republican Solicitors General who might have erred on the side 
of weak conservative interpretations if they erred at all. It is possible that GOP Solicitors 
General defended liberal interpretations less aggressively than conservative ones, but I am 
certain that is not the case, as I read all the briefs for the United States in our sample, and 
I found all of them to have been high quality and aggressive defenses of government posi 
tions. 
105. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 103, at 1154 tbl.20. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
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thize with. Moreover, the study suggests that Justice Scalia's text-driven 
votes in statutory cases have a strong ideological tilt that cannot be ex 
plained by chance, a point that is even more striking for Justice Thomas. 
As a pair, Thomas and Scalia appear more ideologically driven and less 
constrained by their methodology (textualism) than Breyer and 
Ginsburg (purposivism). At the very least, these data establish that textu 
alism is no more constraining, which is contrary to the claim of Scalia 
and Garner's Reading Law. Additionally, the data suggest the hypothesis 
that a methodology that focuses on statutory text and considers commit 
tee reports generated by the legislative process that produced the statute 
(Breyer and Ginsburg's purposivism) is one that is more constraining than 
a methodology that focuses on statutory text and considers "valid canons" 
created by judges (Scalia and Thomas's new textualism). 
That hypothesis receives preliminary empirical verification from the 
work of law professor James Brudney and political scientist Corey 
Ditslear. Analyzing their database of more than thirty years of Supreme 
Court opinions in labor law cases, Brudney and Ditslear report that lib 
eral Justices in those cases were more likely to vote in favor of employer 
interests (i.e., against their ideological preferences) when they relied on 
legislative history.108 During the Burger Court (1969-1986), conservative 
Justices were more likely to vote in favor of worker interests (i.e., against 
their ideological preferences) when they relied on legislative history.109 
Since 1986, however, conservative Justices (including Scalia) have 
ratcheted up their pro-employer results, relying increasingly on canons 
of statutory construction and even legislative history to do so.110 
The Brudney and Ditslear studies are inconsistent with Scalia and 
Garner's claim that the new textualism alone delivers neutral results and 
prevents judges from imbuing statutes with their political preferences. To 
the contrary, their data and their many case examples support precisely 
the opposite thesis, that a canons-based textualism is a relatively less con 
straining approach that enables pro-employer judges to import pro-em 
ployer policies into statutes that were adopted to protect workers. If any 
methodology is constraining, it is one where judges consult legislative 
materials to help them understand textual meaning. The next Part shall 
explore some reasons why this might be the case. 
108. James J. Brudney & Corey Ditslear, Liberal Justices' Reliance on Legislative 
History: Principle, Strategy, and the Scalia Effect, 29 Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 117, 143 
44 tbl.6 (2008) (reporting "changes over time in the outcome-related reliance on legisla 
tive history by liberal and conservative Justices"). The differential was not statistically signif 
icant for liberal Justices as a group but was statistically significant for Justices White and 
Souter. Id. at 142 tbl.5. 
109. Id. at 144 tbl.6. 
110. Id. at 142-44; see Brudney & Ditslear, Canons of Construction, supra note 13, at 
6 (reporting both data and specific case examples where conservative pro-business Justices 
have relied on text and canons to deliver pro-business interpretations that were contrary to 
expectations of enacting Congresses). 
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II. The Norms Problem with the New Canons-Based Textualism 
Statutory interpretation is a normative enterprise. Statutes are pur 
posive, they pervasively affect our lives, and they even reflect our public 
values. A goal of Reading Law is to bleed the appearance of normativity 
out of statutory interpretation, yet the canons the authors present as neu 
tral and canonical are saturated with norms and pervasively demand 
normative judgments from judges. Normative judgments entail discre 
tion—and judicial discretion is the last thing on the agenda of Justice 
Scalia and Professor Garner. Although Reading Law offers its canonical 
rules as a strongly constraining methodology, the individual rules them 
selves (even without the cherry-picking problem) are so open-ended and 
normative that they offer many opportunities forjudges to find friends at 
any interpretive cocktail party. 
A. The Normativity of the Canons 
What Scalia and Garner dub the "valid canons" of statutory interpre 
tation are, both as a collection and individually, quite normative. That is, 
they reflect value judgments and, more important, require value judg 
ments forjudges to apply them. Some of the canons are openly norma 
tive, and some require some thought to see their normativity in opera 
tion. Consider a nonexhaustive list of examples. 
1. Libertarian Values. — Normativity is obvious for the absurdity 
canon,111 the constitutional-doubt canon,112 and the rule of lenity113 dis 
cussed above. All three canons require judges to make very difficult value 
judgments: Is the plain meaning "absurd" (so look for an alternative) or 
just really "unreasonable" (the textualist is stuck with it)? Is the better 
reading of the text one that raises "serious" constitutional problems (so 
the canon can be invoked), or is there just a whiff of constitutional diffi 
culty with that reading (so the canon does not apply)? Has the defendant 
persuaded me that the criminal statute has two plausible meanings, one 
of which acquits him? Although all three of these canons are inspired by 
the U.S. Constitution,114 the Constitution provides no guidelines for 
judges to make these difficult normative judgments. Hence, in particular 
111. Scalia 8c Garner, supra note 2, at 234-40. 
112. Id. at 247-51. 
113. Id. at 296-302; see also supra note 83 and accompanying text (discussing Justice 
Scalia's invocation of rule of lenity in Sweet Home). 
114. The absurdity canon is inspired by the due process/equal protection require 
ment that there be a nonarbitrary "rational basis" for every legal rule. See Scalia & Garner, 
supra note 2, at 239 n.18. The constitutional avoidance canon is inspired by constitutional 
respect for Congress, as well as respect for protecting the boundaries established in the 
Constitution. Id. at 250. The rule of lenity is frequently defended on grounds of due pro 
cess notice or separation of powers, though Scalia and Garner defend it on more prag 
matic grounds. Id. at 296-97. 
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cases, it is hard to predict how judges will apply the absurdity canon115 or 
the avoidance canon.116 "The main difficulty with the rule of lenity is the 
uncertainty of its application."117 
As understood by Justice Scalia, these constitutional canons protect 
liberties Americans (and corporations, under the authors' artificial-per 
son canon118) have long enjoyed and treasured. Thus, in Sweet Home, 
Justice Scalia invoked the rule of lenity to protect the liberty of the "sim 
plest farmer[s]" (as well as multimillion dollar agribusinesses) to develop 
their land at the expense of endangered species habitats, and the out 
raged tone of his dissenting opinion suggests that he may have had 
avoidance concerns about unconstitutional takings in some cases and 
certainly thought that the Department's rule bordered on absurdity.119 
This Blackstonian respect for property rights and our freedom to do with 
property whatever we wish (so long as it does not harm our neighbor) 
was overtaken in the twentieth century by the New Deal's transformation 
of governance. In an era of pervasive regulation, it is far from absurd for 
the government to insist that property owners use their land consistent 
with preservation of the environment.120 
2. Federalism Values. — Another set of constitutional canons are those 
inspired by federalism, the Constitution's division of governmental re 
sponsibilities between state and federal governments. Although it is rare 
for the Supreme Court to strike down national legislation on federalism 
grounds, the Court has developed a fair number of canons to enforce 
this norm.121 Scalia and Garner mention two: the strong presumption 
115. See id. at 237 (presenting Justice Story's exacting interpretation of absurdity 
doctrine). 
116. See id. at 250 (quoting Justice Stevens's explanation of avoidance doctrine, 
Gomez v. United States, 490 U.S. 858, 864 (1989)). 
117. Id. at 298. 
118. Id. at 273-77. 
119. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 714 
(1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
120. See Philip Shabecoff, A Fierce Green Fire: The American Environmental 
Movement 271 (1993) (arguing only government "has the reach to address all of the inter 
locking complexities" of environmental reform); J. Peter Byrne, Green Property, 7 Const. 
Comment. 239, 241-45 (1990) (arguing "the individual possessor does not own the right 
to degrade the natural ecological system on his land" because "such a right must be held 
by the jurisdiction in trust for present and future members of the community"); Terry W. 
Frazier, The Green Alternative to Classical Liberal Property Theory, 20 Vt. L. Rev. 299, 319 
(1995) ("[W]hen the free market fails to correct for an individual's ignorance or denial of 
social responsibility, the rest of society must act collectively to regulate the use and enjoy 
ment of private property."); David B. Hunter, An Ecological Perspective on Property: A 
Call for Judicial Protection of the Public's Interest in Environmentally Critical Resources, 
12 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 311, 311 (1988) (arguing courts "must expand their view and up 
hold the public's legitimate interest in ecological stability and integrity"). 
121. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear 
Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 Vand. L. Rev. 593, 619-29 (1992) [here 
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against congressional abrogation of state sovereign immunity122 and the 
presumption against federal preemption of state law.123 This greatly 
understates the proliferation and aggressive deployment of federal 
ism canons during Justice Scalia's tenure on the Court. In addition to 
the presumptions against abrogation of state immunity and preemp 
tion of state law, the Court (with Justice Scalia in the majority) has 
created a new super-strong rule against federal invasion of "core state 
functions,"124 a strong presumption against statutory interpretations 
that would alter the federal-state balance,125 a new super-strong rule 
against inferring conditions on federal grants to the states under the 
Spending Clause,12" and a dozen or more smaller canons that play out in 
Supreme Court cases almost every term. 
Moreover, the federalism idea drives many other Supreme Court 
opinions that do not explicitly invoke one of the many federalism can 
inafter Eskridge & Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional] (listing six pro-federalism canons 
Supreme Court adopted in 1980s). 
122. Scalia & Garner, supra note 2, at 281-89. 
123. Id. at 290-94. 
124. See Nixon v. Mo. Mun. League, 541 U.S. 125, 140 (2004) (finding "federal 
legislation [that threatens] to trench on the States' arrangements for conducting 
their own governments should be treated with skepticism, and read in a way that 
preserves a State's chosen disposition of its own power"); BFP v. Resolution Trust 
Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 544 (1994) ("'[W]hen the Federal Government takes over . . . 
local radiations in the vast network of our national economic enterprise . . . those 
charged with the duty of legislating [must be] explicit.'" (quoting Felix Frankfurter, 
Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 Colum. L. Rev. 527, 539-40 (1947) 
(alterations in original))); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 461-64 (1991) (requir 
ing courts to be "absolutely certain that Congress intended" to displace state law 
before applying preemption). 
125. See Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 275 (2006) (rejecting Attorney 
General's attempt to prohibit assisted suicide through Controlled Substances Act 
because "Congress did not have [the] far-reaching intent to alter the federal-state 
balance" required); Owasso Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Falvo, 534 U.S. 426, 432 (2002) (hes 
itating to interpret "statute to effect such a substantial change in the balance of fed 
eralism" because it was not "manifest purpose of the legislation"); Raygor v. Regents 
of the Univ. of Minn., 534 U.S. 533, 543 (2002) (noting Congress must make "unmis 
takably clear" its intent to alter "the usual balance between the States and the 
Federal Government" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Gregory, 501 U.S. at 460 
(same); Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 (1989) (same). 
126. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981) 
(" [I] f Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of federal moneys, it 
must do so unambiguously."); see also Arlington Cent. Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. 
Murphy, 548 U.S. 291, 296 (2006) (stressing Pennhursts unambiguity requirement); 
Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 280-81 (2002) (requiring clear and unambigu 
ous intent to create private right of action to sustain suit based on Family 
Educational Rights and Privacy Act); Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 187 (2002) 
(same as Arlington)-, Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 341 (1997) (same as Gonzaga 
for suit based on Title IV-D of Social Security Act); Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347, 
363 (1992) (same as Gonzaga for suit based on Adoption Assistance and Child 
Welfare Act). 
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ons. Justice Scalia, for example, invoked federalism concerns to rewrite a 
provision of the Bankruptcy Code to minimize the Code's impact on 
state property rights.127 It is very likely that federalism concerns played a 
role in his Sweet Home dissent, to protect the "simplest farmer" and ensure 
that state property law was not trumped for "national zoological use."128 
As before, however, federalism must give way to valid congressional regu 
lation—and Scalia's preference for federalism over regulation is more of 
a mobile political preference than a consistent and neutral legal princi 
ple. 
3. Rule of Law/Continuity Values. — Scalia and Garner's particular list 
of canons is dominated by a nonconstitutional value, that of continuity,129 
Continuity is a rule of law value: Americans rely on longstanding legal 
rules, plan their lives around them, and assume that most of the really 
important rules will continue to be in place. Similarly, the rule of law ab 
hors uncertainty and fluctuating rules. These values of continuity under 
gird what Scalia and Garner call the "stabilizing canons," namely the pre 
sumption against change in common law,130 the canon of imputed 
common-law meaning,131 the prior-construction canon,132 the presump 
tion against implied repeals,133 and a few technical canons.134 Continuity 
values are also an important justification for the authors' supremacy-of 
text principle,135 fixed-meaning canon,136 presumption of consistent us 
127. BFP, 511 U.S. at 534, 544-45 (Scalia, J.) (affirming lower court decision 
that openly confessed to not following provision's plain meaning, based upon pref 
erence for not unsettling state property law); see also Rapanos v. United States, 547 
U.S. 715, 738 (2006) (Scalia, J., plurality opinion) (requiring "clear and manifest" 
intent from Congress to extend Clean Water Act jurisdiction to regulate state-con 
trolled wetlands). 
128. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 714 
(1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also supra note 96 and accompanying text (discuss 
ing this language). 
129. See David L. Shapiro, Continuity and Change in Statutory Interpretation, 67 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 921, 945-47 (1992) (arguing rules of construction based in continuity val 
ues are "sub-constitutional" or "extra-constitutional"). 
130. See Scalia & Garner, supra note 2, at 318-19 ("A statute will be construed to al 
ter the common law only when that disposition is clear."). 
131. Id. at 320-21 ("A statute that uses a common-law term, without defining it, 
adopts its common-law meaning."). 
132. Id. at 322-26 ("If a statute uses words or phrases that have already received 
authoritative construction by the jurisdiction's court of last resort, or even uniform con 
struction by inferior courts or a responsible administrative agency, they are to be under 
stood according to that construction."). 
133. Id. at 327-33 ("Repeals by implication are disfavored . . . [b]ut a provision that 
flatly contradicts an earlier-enacted provision repeals it."). 
134. These include the repeal-of-repealer canon ("The repeal or expiration of a 
repealing statute does not reinstate the original statute.") and the desuetude canon ("A 
statute is not repealed by nonuse or desuetude."). Id. at 334—39. 
135. Id. at 56-58 ("The words of a governing text are of paramount concern, and 
what they convey, in their context, is what the text means."). 
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age,137 presumption against federal preemption,138 and presumption 
against implied rights of action.139 And of course the best example of a 
continuity-preserving canon is the stare decisis rule, which Scalia and 
Garner do not discuss but do endorse as an exception to textualism in 
many cases.140 
But, like the other canons, the continuity canons are not absolute.141 
"If the context makes clear that a statute uses a common-law term with a 
different meaning," the authors say, "the common-law meaning is of 
course inapplicable."142 So in Sweet Home, one would expect the meaning 
of "take" to be broader than the common-law meaning, because 
Congress explicitly defined the term more broadly.143 Thus, judges are 
bound by the congressional definition—unless the definition itself is 
vague, in which case Justice Scalia sees his way clear to apply something 
close to the common-law meaning.144 All of these moves entail value 
laden choices on the part of Justice Scalia and his dissenting colleagues 
in Sweet Home. (1) to anchor judgment on the common-law meaning of 
"take," (2) to read the statutory definition of "take" quite narrowly, and 
(3) to belittle the broad purpose of the statute as a reason to give the 
terms in the statutory definition their ordinary meaning. The agency 
136. Id. at 78-92 ("Words must be given the meaning they had when the text was 
adopted."). 
137. Id. at 170-73 ("A word or phrase is presumed to bear the same meaning 
throughout a text; a material variation in terms suggests a variation in meaning."). 
138. Id. at 290-94 ("A federal statute is presumed to supplement rather than displace 
state law."). 
139. Id. at 313-17 ("A statute's mere prohibition of a certain act does not imply crea 
tion of a private right of action for its violation. The creation of such a right must be either 
express or clearly implied from the text of the statute."). 
140. See id. at 411-14 (observing that stare decisis "is an exception to textualism . . . 
born not of logic but of necessity . . . [it] has been part of our law from time immemorial, 
and we must bow to it"). 
141. I would make this caveat: The rule against implied repeals appears well-nigh 
absolute. The Supreme Court has rarely found implicit repeals, and the Justices will go to 
great lengths to preserve preexisting statutes against implied repeals. See, e.g., Branch v. 
Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 292 (2005) (Stevens, J., concurring in part) (describing plurality's 
refusal to admit implied repeal as "torturedjudicial legislation"). 
142. Scalia & Garner, supra note 2, at 321. 
143. See id. at 225-33 (describing interpretive direction canon: "Definition sections 
and interpretation clauses are to be carefully followed."). Thus, under the common law 
rule of Pierson v. Post, the fox was not "taken" by the hunter who "pursued" it. See supra 
note 97 and accompanying text (discussing Pierson holding). In contrast, under the endan 
gered species law, a hunter who "pursues" a fox that was an endangered species, is deemed 
to "take" that fox. See Endangered Species Act of 1973 § 3(19), 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19) 
(2006) (defining "take" to include "pursue"). 
144. See Scalia 8c Garner, supra note 2, at 228-32 (arguing that when "a definition it 
self contains a term that is not clear . . . the meaning of the definition is almost always 
closely related to the ordinary meaning of the term being defined"). 
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made precisely the opposite value choices, and the 1982 ESA 
Amendments suggest that Congress ratified the agency's choices.145 
4. Normalization Values (Ordinary Meaning Canon). — Consistent with 
Supreme Court practice, the ordinary meaning canon posits that 
"[w]ords are to be understood in their ordinary, everyday meanings— 
unless the context indicates that they bear a technical sense."146 This 
would appear to be the classic neutral principle for statutory interpreta 
tion: Simply apply this nonpolitical rule, and your job is done. In prac 
tice, however, even the ordinary meaning canon is value-laden, and the 
primary value is normalization. Under this canon, there is a "normal" way 
of speaking English, and the Supreme Court is going to enforce its un 
derstanding of "normal" usage upon Congress. Moreover, the social 
practice of normalization can be highly political, and that politicization is 
well illustrated in statutory interpretation. 
Justice Scalia once said that ordinary meaning requires judges to ask 
"whether you could use the word in that sense at a cocktail party without 
having people look at you funny."147 As in Reading Law, he considers 
nothing more neutral and law-like than normal use at a cocktail party, 
and he seems oblivious to the possibility that meaning might depend on 
what crowd the judge parties with, and I mean that literally. Recall the 
Sweet Home debate over what the ESA means when it says that private 
property owners cannot "take" an endangered species. In the 1990s, 
there was a heartfelt and strong reaction to "excessive" environmental 
regulation that limited property use, especially among farmers (and not 
just the simplest ones) and ranchers in the American West. Predictably, 
the antiregulatory discourse found its way into constitutional scholarship 
and public policy discourse148—and ultimately into Justice Scalia's 
dissenting opinion in Sweet Home. If Justice Scalia had described the statu 
tory scheme and said that the "simplest farmer" does not "take" an en 
dangered species when he destroys its habitat, no one would look at him 
funny at a Federalist Society cocktail party—but Scalia would have gotten 
funny looks and a ferocious argument if he were partying with a Sierra 
Club crowd. 
145. See infra Part II.C (discussing Sweet Home dissent's rationale and congressional 
action at issue). 
146. Scalia 8c Garner, supra note 2, at 69. 
147. Johnson v. United States, 529 U.S. 694, 718 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
148. See generally Jonathan H. Adler, Back to the Future of Conservation: Changing 
Perceptions of Property Rights and Environmental Protection, 1 N.Y.U. J.L. & Liberty 987 
(2005) (providing overview of discourse); John McClaughry, The New Feudalism, 5 Envtl. 
L. 675 (1975) (providing early normative declaration); Bruce Yandle, Escaping 
Environmental Feudalism, 15 Harv. J.L. 8c Pub. Pol'y 517 (1992) (comparing federal envi 
ronmental law policy to feudalism). For a response, see generally Richard J. Lazarus, 
Debunking Environmental Feudalism: Promoting the Individual Through the Collective 
Pursuit of Environmental Quality, 77 Iowa L. Rev. 1739 (1992) (challenging analogy to 
feudalism). 
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The punch line of cocktail party textualism is that meaning depends 
on context—not just the words and provisions surrounding the text be 
ing interpreted, but also the supposed audience for the textual interpre 
tation. When Justice Scalia opened his Sweet Home dissent with the crack 
about "conscription] for national zoological use," he was revealing his 
supposed audience, the guys he partied with—who were not members of 
Congress of 1973 or 1982, nor were they "ordinary" Americans, either. 
The most salient audiences for his dissent (his fellow cocktail partiers) 
were the Federalist Society, the Sagebrush Rebellion, and the Property 
Rights Social Movement. Most of the folks in this audience are fine peo 
ple, but they are only part of America. A danger of the new textualism, 
revealed in Justice Scalia's opinions and in Reading Law, is that using or 
dinary meaning to figure out statutory meaning is like entering a cocktail 
party populated by people who think like you and seeking their confir 
mation that everyone else uses language the way your group does. 
5. Purposive Values. — In a comprehensive examination of Justice 
Scalia's dissenting opinions (where he speaks in his own voice, with less 
modulation from his colleagues), Miranda McGowan reports that the 
Justice relies on purposive reasoning, rather than ordinary meaning 
analysis, in a large majority of cases.149 Scalia and Garner's Reading Law 
openly confirms McGowan's findings, as it usefully states—as a 
"fundamental principle[]" of statutory interpretation—that "[a] textually 
permissible interpretation that furthers rather than obstructs the 
document's purpose should be favored."150 Equally candid, and 
illuminating, is the authors' admission that normative context deter 
mines the applicability of many of the textual canons that they survey. 
The remainder of this section provides examples of, and even expands 
upon, a few of the most famous (and controversial) textual canons. 
The inclusio (or expressio) unius canon posits that the inclusion (or 
expression) of one thing implies the exclusion of all others.151 Scalia and 
Garner include this in their list of "valid canons" but make the reader 
sharply aware of its limitations: "The doctrine properly applies only when 
the unius (or technically, unum, the thing specified) can reasonably be 
thought to be an expression of all that shares in the grant or prohibition 
involved. Common sense often suggests when this is or is not so."152 
Employing this useful principle typically involves normative reason 
ing, as illustrated by the following example. Parent tells Sally, "Stop 
biting and scratching your little brother!" If Sally stops those activities 
and then kicks the kid, she cannot invoke inclusio unius as an excuse, 
149. See McGowan, supra note 57, at 135 (reportingjustice Scalia considers purpose 
of statute or consequences of different interpretations in three-quarters of his dissenting 
opinions). 
150. Scalia & Garner, supra note 2, at 63. 
151. Id. at 107. 
152. Id. 
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because it is unreasonable to think that biting and scratching exhaust all 
the activities entailed in the command. Indeed, one should interpret 
Parent's command to implicitly include kicking in its list of prohibitions. 
And the analysis would start with the notion that the command had as its 
purpose the prevention of harm to little brother and reason from that 
purpose not only that the command did not implicitly authorize the kick 
ing, but also that the command implicitly forbade the kicking. If I am 
right about the purpose, I believe I am right about the scope of the 
command—but please be aware that the new canons-based textualism of 
the sort advanced by Scalia and Garner might (or might not) reject the 
second half of the analysis.153 
Consider also the associated words (noscitur a sociis) canon, that 
one word in a list ought to be applied consistently with the theme of the 
list.154 As before, Scalia and Garner provide a useful limiting principle: 
"For the associated-words canon to apply, the terms must be conjoined in 
such a way as to indicate that they have some quality in common."155 With 
this limiting principle in mind, Justice Scalia had no problem applying 
the noscitur a sociis canon in Sweet Home, where he argued that "harm" in 
the definition provision for "take" should be understood to have essential 
qualities in common with the other words in the list ("wound," "trap," 
"kill," and so forth).156 This is an intelligent deployment of noscitur a 
sociis, but my quarrel is that the commonality of the terms in the list 
could be specified in a variety of ways. Inspired by the common law of 
property and its use of the term "take," Scalia focused on the way in 
which all the other terms entailed action targeted at a particular ani 
mal157—but I do not see why all the terms in the list do not have a more 
obvious commonality, namely, they all entail action by human beings that 
render an already endangered species somewhat more likely to become 
extinct. 
The commonality that I find has the huge advantage of linking the 
explicit statutory definition with the explicit statutory purpose: Section 
2(b) of the ESA specifically says that a core goal of the statute is to pro 
tect the habitat of endangered species. I am baffled that eminent jurists 
were not only unwilling to admit that the text-based purpose provided 
153. This move, adding implied activities, seems inconsistent with Scalia and Garner's 
omitted-case canon, that "[n]othing is to be added to what the text states or reasonably 
implies .... That is, a matter not covered is to be treated as not covered." Id. at 93. It 
might also be contrary to their understanding of the rule of lenity, see id. at 296-99, be 
cause it would penalize as a family crime an activity not explicitly named. To be sure, 
Scalia and Garner, or others using their list (including me), could come out the other way 
by saying that kicking is "reasonably implied" in Parent's command. But, as this Part ar 
gues, that is a normative judgment that is hard to predict in advance. 
154. Id. at 195-98. 
155. Id. at 196. 
156 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 719-20 
(1995) (Scalia,J., dissenting). 
157. Id. 
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the common feature required by noscitur a sociis, but apparently were 
unable to conceive of the possibility that this suggested commonality was 
even possible. Were they so outraged by the national conscription of the 
"simplest farmer" that they could not even imagine that the common 
theme in the verbs defining "take" was the broad purpose announced in 
the statutory text? 
B. How Legislative History Helps Us Understand Statutory Purpose 
Scalia and Garner's Reading Law suggests, and this Review has devel 
oped more aggressively, how much statutory interpretation by the rules en 
tails value judgments by judges and how those value judgments are 
driven by the judge's understanding of the statutory purpose. How does 
the judge figure out the statutory purpose? Scalia and Garner maintain 
that statutory purpose should be derived from statutory text. Sometimes, 
and increasingly, enacted statutes will include purpose provisions, such as 
those contained in the ESA.158 This is potentially quite helpful, but it is 
not a complete solution. Enacted statutory purposes are usually multiple 
(and potentially conflicting) and are set at a high level of generality, 
which makes them less than determinate aids for understanding how to 
apply statutory texts. Additionally, statutes often do not include a "pur 
poses" provision on their face, and it is not clear how a judge derives un 
ambiguous purpose from an ambiguous text. Without a robust theory of 
statutory purpose, Scalia and Garner provide lawyers and judges with lit 
tle more than manipulable and indeterminate canons to argue about. 
Indeed, their book may seriously mislead lawyers about how statutes 
ought to be applied. 
As an example, consider Scalia and Garner's application of H.L.A. 
Hart's famous hypothetical statute, "No person may bring a vehicle into 
the park."159 In a wonderful exercise in sophisticated linguistic analysis, 
Scalia and Garner work their way through a variety of dictionary defini 
tions of "vehicle," finding that none of them quite fits the statute. "The 
proper colloquial meaning in our view (not all of them are to be found 
in dictionaries) is simply a sizable wheeled conveyance (as opposed to one 
of any size that is motorized)."160 Thus, the authors would apply the 
prohibitory ordinance to automobiles, golf carts, mopeds, and 
("perhaps") Segways—but not to "airplanes, bicycles, roller skates, and 
toy automobiles."161 This strikes me as an utterly judicious, well-informed, 
and highly illuminating linguistic analysis—but a crazy legal analysis. 
158. 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (2006). 
159. Scalia & Garner, supra note 2, at 36-39 ("The example, according to Hart, illus 
trates that there are 'debatable cases in which words are neither obviously applicable nor 
obviously ruled out.'"). 
160. Id. at 37. 
161. Id. at 38. 
This content downloaded from 130.132.173.101 on Tue, 8 Apr 2014 00:20:55 AM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
2013] NEW TEXTUAUSM AND NORMATIVE CANONS 561 
Let me explain the crazy point. I do not see how a judge can even 
begin to answer the interpretive questions in the no-vehicle law without 
understanding, from the perspective of the legislature and the political 
culture that produced the statute, what the purpose of the statute was. 
For example, the city council could have been responding to complaints 
that kids riding bicycles as well as motorscooters have been running into 
older park visitors and even little children, with injurious consequences. 
Responding to outrage from the AARP, parent groups, and other politi 
cal powerhouses, the councilmember sponsoring the measure promised 
her colleagues and the voters that the ordinance "would head off acci 
dents like these bicycling and motorscooter atrocities, by banning them 
from the park altogether." If that were the legislative background of the 
ordinance, its purpose was to preserve public safety, especially for the 
very old and the very young persons using the city parks. To say, as Scalia 
and Garner do, that the statute does not apply to bicycles is quite crazy 
from the perspective of responsible governance. A no-vehicles law whose 
purpose is a prophylactic safety purpose is not one that should be applied 
based only on the size of the vehicle; some small vehicles can harm peo 
ple more than big ones.162 
To be sure, a purpose approach does not answer all interpretive 
questions. For example, given a safety purpose (and the previous bicycle 
accidents), does the statute ban tricycles? Those little contraptions can 
go pretty fast, but not nearly as fast as bicycles, and are usually operated 
by tiny tots who are unlikely to harm anyone. But how about adult tricy 
cles? Should they be treated as bicycles? How about skateboards, which 
may be just as much a safety hazard as bicycles but are less susceptible to 
colloquial understanding as "vehicles?" These are questions that are hard 
to answer in the abstract—but knowing the statutory purpose helps us ask 
the right questions. And these are frequently the kinds of questions that 
legislators discuss in floor speeches and committee reports, which might 
provide illumination forjudges seeking to follow legislative directives. 
Scalia and Garner seem to think that statutory purpose can simply 
be divined from statutory text, so why forego such divination in the no 
vehicles example? Surely the reason is that bare text does not tell us 
which of several purposes animated the legislature, nor does it tell us 
what kinds of dangers the legislature was most concerned with and which 
ones would have been considered de minimis. Scalia and Garner object 
that such a purpose-based inquiry is nothing more than a search for 
"legislative intent," which they consider one of the greatest canards in 
162. There are other potential purposes that better fit the linguistic applications 
imagined by Scalia and Garner. If the ordinance were adopted to respond to complaints of 
noisy and air-polluting (motor) vehicles in the park, then the Scalia and Garner applica 
tion (barring motor vehicles but not bicycles) would work much better. Although the 
statutory language is the same, the application ought to be different, given different statu 
tory purposes. 
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statutory interpretation.163 Linguist Lawrence Solan has responded, in 
some detail, to Justice Scalia's critique of legislative intent: The law pre 
sumes collective intent all the time, and the conventions of the legislative 
process render the notion of legislative intent readily intelligible in most 
instances.164 
But even under the premises of Scalia and Garner's canons-based 
textualism, legislative history is useful, for it helps the judge, a stranger to 
the statutory project, understand how words are being used. It opens up 
the judicial mind to possibilities that might not have occurred to the 
judge—what I call the hermeneutical value of legislative history. This ex 
pansion of possible word usage is the textualists' justification for reliance 
on The Federalist Papers to understand the original meaning of the 
Constitution of 1789,165 and it can be argued that legislative history is 
relevant for the same kinds of reasons as constitutional debating history. 
The next section provides a surprising example of how persuasive such 
materials can be. 
C. Legislative History, Statutory Purpose, and Sweet Home v. Babbitt 
Recall the judicial debate over the meaning of the ESA's anti-take 
provision in Sweet Home. In support of his broad understanding of "take," 
Justice Stevens, for the Court, invoked the congressional purpose set 
forth on the face of the statute, namely, to protect endangered species in 
163. Scalia & Garner, supra note 2, at 391-96. 
164. Solan, Language, supra note 39, at 82-83 (justifying judicial reliance on legisla 
tive intent based on ubiquitous attribution of "intent to a group of people based on the 
intent of a subset of that group"); Lawrence M. Solan, Private Language, Public Laws: The 
Central Role of Legislative Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 93 Geo. L.J. 427, 437-49 
(2005) ("[T]he legislature would accept the notion that its intent is reflected in the intent 
of those who most had a stake in framing and negotiating . . . the law. . . . [T]he legisla 
ture's reliance on committees to work out the details of legislation is a formal part of the 
process and always has been."). For demonstrations that collective intent is a meaningful 
idea for congressional compromises and deals, see Brudney, Chatter, supra note 39, at 52 
56 (describing congressional members' incentives to remain "honest and fair even during 
fierce partisan debates" and "not to overstate or understate the bill's . . . objectives"); 
Daniel B. Rodriguez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of Legislative 
History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Its Interpretation, 151 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 1417, 1431-35 (2003) (asserting statutes and corresponding legislative history are 
reflections of legislative "specialization and expertise" and a "vitally important object of 
trade and negotiation"). 
165. E.g., Nat'l Fed'n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2655 (2012) (Scalia, 
Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting) (using The Federalist No. 58 as argument against 
construction that "Individual Mandate merely imposes a tax" because Framers gave taxing 
power to House); Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2511-12 (2012) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing The Federalist No. 42 as evidence of 
Framers' original intent to give Congress naturalization power, "not to abrogate States' 
power to exclude those they did not want, but to vindicate it"); Printz v. United States, 521 
U.S. 898, 910 (1997) (characterizing The Federalist as source that Supreme Court "usually 
regard[s] as indicative of the original understanding of the Constitution"). 
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general and, more specifically, '"to provide a means whereby the ecosys 
tems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend 
may be conserved.'"166 That sounds like a winning argument, combining 
a broad statutory text with a specifically confirming statutory purpose 
and a longstanding agency understanding entitled to strong deference 
under the Court's Chevron doctrine.167 
But the devil is in the details—and Justice Scalia had a smart re 
sponse to the majority's argument. Yes, one purpose of the ESA was to 
protect the habitat for endangered species, but section 9, prohibiting 
private landowners from taking such species, was not the mechanism 
Congress intended as the vehicle for advancing this particular purpose. 
Two other provisions of the 1973 Act were explicitly concerned with hab 
itat protection: Section 7 explicitly barred federal projects from harming 
the habitat of endangered species,168 and section 5 authorized the 
Department to use its eminent domain power to secure needed habitat 
from private landowners,169 thereby leaving section 9's anti-take regula 
tion probably concerned with more targeted activities.170 
This is a good structural argument, but, as is often the case for struc 
tural arguments, it involves a pile of judicial inferences that are debata 
ble. There was nothing in the explicit text of the 1973 Act that estab 
lished the differentiated structure hypothesized byjustice Scalia. Reading 
nothing but the text of the statute, it is perfectly reasonable to say that 
sections 5 and 7 are the primary mechanisms for protecting habitat, with 
section 9 being an ancillary but important mechanism as well. Section 
2(b)'s statement of the statutory protection-of-habitat purpose did not 
differentiate among the various strategies followed in the statute. As 
Scalia and Garner caution, "general words" are supposed to be applied 
generally,171 and so if there is any ambiguity in the statute's definition of 
"take" to include any "harm" to an endangered species, that ambiguity 
ought to be resolved to "further" the statutory purpose.172 Ever going for 
the analytical jugular, however, Justice Scalia (or his contextually in 
clined law clerk) came up with some smoking guns that provide cogent 
support for his reading of the statutory structure. 
166. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 698-99 
(1995) (quoting Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (b) (1988 & Supp. V 1994)). 
167. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 
(1984) (describing judiciary's duty to "respect legitimate policy choices" made by federal 
agencies). 
168. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a); see TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 193-95 (1978) (enforcing 
dramatically § 7's habitat-protective rule by requiring TVA to halt construction of $100 
million dam that would allegedly have destroyed necessary habitat for endangered spe 
cies). 
169. 16 U.S.C. § 1534. 
170. See Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 727-30 (Scalia,J., dissenting). 
171. Scalia 8c Garner, supra note 2, at 101. 
172. Id. at 63. 
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The smoking guns were in the form of floor speeches by both Senate 
and House sponsors articulating the protection-of-habitat purpose with 
greater precision and, probably, reflecting the compromises reached 
among the coalition of legislators supporting the statute.173 As the House 
manager put it: 
[T]he principal threat to animals stems from the destruc 
tion of their habitat. . . . [ The bill] will meet this problem by provid 
ing funds for acquisition of critical habitat .... It will also enable 
the Department of Agriculture to cooperate with willing land 
owners who desire to assist in the protection of endangered 
species, but who are understandably unwilling to do so at excessive cost 
to themselves. 
Another hazard to endangered species arises from those 
who would capture or kill them for pleasure or profit. There is no way 
that the Congress can make it less pleasurable for a person to 
take an animal, but we can certainly make it less profitable for 
them to do so.174 
The Senate floor manager made a similar speech before his cham 
ber. These portions of the legislative history, unrebutted by the govern 
ment's excellent brief (itself chock full of legislative history),175 are 
exactly the kind of materials that are relevant to statutory interpretation: 
The authors of the statutory project openly explain, in documents or 
transcripts that are certain to be read by legislators and their staffs, what 
the statute's primary purpose is, how it is carried out in particular statu 
tory provisions, and how it relates (if at all) to the provision in question. 
Complementing and indeed completing his analysis of statutory struc 
ture, Justice Scalia's analysis of legislative history persuades me that the 
1973 Act did not require private property owners to avoid any harm to 
the habitat of endangered species.176 Thus, the Department went too far 
173. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 727-28 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (preferring "direct evi 
dence" from Senate and House floor managers of bill over majority's reliance on "various 
pre-enactment actions and inactions"). 
174. 119 Cong. Ree. 30,162 (1973) (statement of Rep. Leonor Sullivan) (emphasis 
added), quoted in Sweet Home, 515 U.S. at 728 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
175. Brief for Petitioners at 25-30, Sweet Home, 515 U.S. 687 (No. 94-859), 1995 WL 
89293, at *25-*30 (containing Solicitor General's rendition of relevant legislative history 
for 1973 Act). 
176. Another bit of legislative history, emphasized by the D.C. Circuit but not by 
Justice Scalia, is somewhat supportive of Scalia's narrower reading of section 9(a). One of 
the bills deliberated by the Senate committee would have defined "take" to mean to 
"threaten, harass, hunt, capture, or kill [an endangered species] ... or the destruction, 
modification, or curtailment of its habitat or range." S. 1983, 93d Cong. § 3(6) (1973). 
The Senate committee opted for the more general definition, which added "harm" and 
other activities, but its refusal to go with the habitat-targeting language adds some cogency 
to Justice Scalia's structural argument. Standing alone, the rejected proposal is not disposi 
tive, because the committee deal may be construed as actually broadening the definition 
of "take": the addition of "harm" made the definition so broad that the habitat-protecting 
language was unnecessary. 
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in 1975, when it originally adopted the habitat-protecting interpretation 
of "harm" for purposes of section 9(a)(1). 
So two cheers for Justice Scalia, but his brief embrace of legislative 
history did not go far enough. One feature of Justice Scalia's new and 
frequently dynamic textualism is that when Congress amends statutes, 
the amendments can expand or contract the meaning of the original 
statutory language.177 And that is precisely what happened to the ESA. 
After the Department issued its broad habitat-protection regulation in 
1975, Congress heard testimony from ranchers and farmers objecting to 
the Department's broad regulation and considered bills to override that 
regulation's statutory definition. Not only did Congress refuse to over 
ride the Department, but legislation amending the ESA in 1978 took as a 
working assumption that section 9(a) (1) (B) barred everyone from harm 
ing endangered species by destroying needed habitats.178 
In 1982, a more serious challenge to the 1975 regulation emerged: 
The new Reagan Administration and the new Republican-controlled 
Senate favored an override of the Department's habitat regulation—but 
the Democrat-controlled House did not. To compromise between the 
pro-environmental forces in the House and the pro-farmer and rancher 
forces in the Senate, Congress, in the ESA Amendments of 1982, built 
upon the Department's interpretation of section 9(a)(1)(B) but pro 
vided for a broader exemption mechanism via permit application, in new 
section 10(a)(1)(B), for incidental and cost-justified habitat incursions 
by private enterprises.179 The committee reports demonstrate that 
Congress in 1982 was both accepting the Department's interpretation 
177. Cf., e.g., United Sav. Ass'n of Tex. v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., 484 U.S. 
365, 371 (1988) (Scalia, J.) (finding Bankruptcy Code legislative history's silence on with 
drawal of alleged, pre-Code absolute right to foreclose did not indicate intent to preserve 
right). 
178. When Congress enacted the Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1978, 
Pub. L. No. 95-632, 92 Stat. 3751, in the immediate wake of the Court's decision in TVA v. 
Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978), not only did Congress reject serious proposals to override the 
Department's harm regulation, but the Amendments added section 7 (o) to the ESA. 
Section 7(o) exempts from section 9 federal habitat-threatening projects (like the TVA 
dam) if they are granted an exemption from section 7(a)'s rules for federal projects 
through a new procedure Congress created in 1978. Endangered Species Act 
Amendments § 3, 92 Stat, at 3752-60 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. § 1536(o)); see 
also Brief for Petitioners, supra note 175, 1995 WL 89293, at *31-*33 (recounting legisla 
tive history of section 7(o)). Section 7(o) would have been superfluous if section 9(a) does 
not prohibit interference with the habitat of an endangered species. Because the new 
textualism has a strong presumption against statutory surplusage, Justice Scalia ought to 
have considered section 7(o) a strong support for the majority's interpretation of section 
9(a). 
179. Endangered Species Act Amendments of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-304, § 6, 96 Stat. 
1411, 1422-25 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a)(1)(B)) (establishing permit system for 
"takings" incidental to lawful activities and not for purpose of threatening endangered 
species); see also Brief for Petitioners, supra note 175, 1995 WL 89293, at *34—*38 (provid 
ing legislative history of revision of section 10 by 1982 Amendments). 
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and ameliorating its potentially harsh application.180 But, after crediting 
floor statements to support his view of the 1973 Act, Justice Scalia refused 
to credit committee reports that went against his view of the 1982 
Amendments, purportedly because the text of revised section 10 did not, 
on its face, codify the Department's 1975 regulation.181 
This is judicial cherry-picking with a vengeance. Justice Scalia con 
ceded that the Senate Report and the Conference Report explaining the 
1982 ESA Amendments explicitly informed members of Congress that 
section 9(a) barred farmers and ranchers from depriving endangered 
species of needed habitat and that new section 10(a) was a measure to 
provide administrative relief from harsh applications of the now 
established section 9(a) rule, but he belittled any harm that would occur 
were the Court to ignore congressional deals of this sort: 
There is little fear, of course, that giving no effect to the 
relevant portions of the Committee Reports will frustrate the 
real-life expectations of a majority of the Members of Congress. 
If they read and relied on such tedious detail on such an ob 
scure point (it was not, after all, presented as a revision of the 
statute's prohibitory scope, but as a discretionary-waiver provi 
sion) the Republic would be in grave peril.182 
This is an astonishingly dismissive understanding of the serious work 
that Congress does and an unprincipled basis for distinguishing his own 
use of legislative history to interpret the original 1973 Act from his re 
fusal to do so when construing the Act as amended in 1982. 
The most judicious approach to Sweet Home is to learn something 
from both Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens: As Scalia argued, the 
Department's habitat regulation went beyond the authority it had under 
the 1973 Act, but Stevens was right that Congress ratified that regulation 
when it amended the statute in 1982. Given the congressional purpose, 
rather than the political agendas of the various Justices, I think this is the 
right answer—and it is not an answer easily secured without consulting 
180. See H.R. Rep. No. 97-835, at 29 (1982) (Conf. Rep.) ("This provision addresses 
the concerns of private landowners who are faced with having otherwise lawful actions . . . 
prevented by section 9 prohibitions against taking."); S. Rep. No. 97-418, at 10 (1982) 
("The proposed amendment [to subsection 10(a)] should lead to resolution of potential 
conflicts between endangered species and the actions of private developers . . . ."). The 
section 10 permit process was described in the Senate Report as being modeled after the 
response to a specific situation in San Mateo County, California, in which the "taking" of 
endangered butterflies was incidental to "the development of some 3000 dwelling units" 
on a site inhabited by the species—i.e., was incidental to habitat modification. Id. The 
Conference Report similarly discussed the San Mateo project and noted that large por 
tions of the butterflies' habitat were privately owned and that the conservation plan devel 
oped through governmental and private efforts "preserves sufficient habitat to allow for 
enhancement of the survival of the species." H.R. Rep. No. 97-835, at 30-32. 
181. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 727-30 
(1995) (Scalia,J., dissenting). 
182. Id. at 730-31. 
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the ongoing legislative history of critique and revision of the endangered 
species statute.183 
III. The Democracy Problem with the New Canons-Based Textualism 
The canons-based textualism explicated in Reading Law is, in prac 
tice, an episodically dynamic theory of statutory interpretation, partly 
because it demands that judges update statutes to take account of new 
statutory developments, and partly because it offers many opportunities 
for judges to read their political preferences into statutes. The cherry 
picking and norms problems explored above create a democracy prob 
lem. In cases like Sweet Home, unelected, life-tenured federal judges are 
making important policy choices and trying to impose them upon stat 
utes without regard to congressional goals and compromises and often 
without due deference to the longstanding policies followed by executive 
agencies and ratified by Congress. Elected representatives are accounta 
ble to the voters, who not only put them into office based on their policy 
positions but can remove them from office if they favor policies out of 
sync with their electorates. Although neither elected nor removable by 
voters, agencies accountable to the President have a modest accountabil 
ity advantage over Article III judges, because the President is attentive to 
voters' preferences and because agency heads do rotate with the electoral 
cycles.184 
One of the many values of legislative history forjudges is that it con 
nects them with the legislative (and, typically, the legislative-executive) 
deliberations that preceded the statute's enactment and that inform the 
rest of us who are intimately familiar with the normative choices made by 
our elected legislators. In other words, taking legislative history seriously, 
even when it does not have the smoking gun Justice Scalia's law clerk 
found in Sweet Home, ameliorates the countermajoritarian difficulty with 
judicial interpretation of statutes. This theoretical point is well illustrated 
183. The vacillation Justice Scalia revealed in Sweet Home is far from unique. Although 
it is well known that Scalia will pointedly refuse to join majority opinions that even men 
tion legislative history, especially those written by "liberal" colleagues, he will often join 
majority opinions filled with legislative history when they are written by more conservative 
colleagues and reach property-protecting, pro-business conservative results. In the most 
remarkable example, Justice Scalia joined every sentence and every footnote of Justice 
O'Connor's lengthy recitation of legislative history in the FDA Tobacco Case, FDA v. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 123, 137-39, 143-56 (2000), even 
though there was a perfectly good textual basis for the Court's holding. See id. at 140-43 
(relying in part on "straightforward reading" of Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act to hold 
FDA does not have authority to regulate tobacco products). 
184. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 
(1984) (announcing new reason for deferring to agency decisionmaking, namely, ac 
countability of agencies to President, which gives them democracy advantage over judges 
in rendering "political" judgments); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 Harv. 
L. Rev. 2245, 2331-33 (2001) (arguing "presidential leadership enhances transparency" 
and makes bureaucracy more responsive to public). 
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in Supreme Court practice. Aggressively applying the canons set forth in 
Reading Law, Justice Scalia's own performance over a quarter century on 
the Supreme Court is an example of the democracy problem, where 
judges substitute their political judgments for the ones made by Congress 
or by agencies accountable to the President. In the labor cases that 
Brudney and Ditslear have analyzed, as well as civil rights and other kinds 
of cases, regulation-loving liberal Congresses enacted statutes that Justice 
Scalia and other Blackstonian Justices have been bending toward their 
own values.185 In practice, the new canons-based textualism creates a big 
democracy deficit. 
The democracy problem is especially acute when judges apply can 
ons of construction that they have created and ignore legislative history 
that Congress has created.186 For example, Scalia and Garner say that 
"[m]any established principles of interpretation" rest on "grounds of pol 
icy adopted by the courts."187 They mention the rule of lenity, the 
requirement that punitive statutes can only be applied to conduct clearly 
described on the face of the statute.188 The rule of lenity has a genuine, 
perhaps powerful, impact on statutory interpretation and makes it harder 
for Congress to create an aggressive regulatory criminal law regime.189 
Whatjustifies this heavy judicial thumb on the scales? 
Scalia and Garner do not defend the rule of lenity on its constitu 
tional merits but instead say that "rules like these, so deeply ingrained, 
must be known to both drafter and reader alike so that they can be con 
185. See Brudney & Ditslear, Canons of Construction, supra note 13, at 15-29 
(engaging in empirical analysis of Supreme Court's labor cases, with emphasis on canons 
based decisions after Justice Scalia joined Court); Brudney, Canon Shortfalls, supra note 
35, at 1207 (describing some use of canons as "troubling forms of countermajoritarian 
judicial activism"). A similar point has been made for civil rights statutes. See William N. 
Eskridge, Jr., Reneging on History? Playing the Court/Congress/President Civil Rights 
Game, 79 Calif. L. Rev. 613, 683 (1991) (describing process whereby canon-wielding 
Justices read civil rights laws restrictively, triggering angry congressional overrides and 
charges that Justices were "reneging" on legislative bargains); Deborah A. Widiss, 
Undermining Congressional Overrides: The Hydra Problem in Statutory Interpretation, 
90 Tex. L. Rev. 859, 942 (2012) (lamenting that even when Congress overrides Court, 
conservative Justices interpret override statutes as narrowly as possible); Kathryn A. 
Eidmann, Comment, Ledbetter in Congress: The Limits of a Narrow Legislative Override, 
117 Yale L.J. 971, 979 (2008) (arguing legislative overrides are often insufficient to re 
spond to overly conservative construction of statute). 
186. See Brudney & Ditslear, Canons of Construction, supra note 13, at 15-29 
(providing array of examples where pro-employer Republican Justices interpret statutes to 
advance employer interests over labor interests, even though legislative history examined 
by dissenting Justices demonstrates majority was reading statutory text incorrectly). 
187. Scalia & Garner, supra note 2, at 30. 
188. Id. at 296-302. 
189. See Eskridge & Baer, supra note 103, at 1142 tbl.15 (reporting very low win rate, 
36.2%, when Court applies or recognizes "anti-deference" presumptions, including rule of 
lenity, compared with overall agency win rate of 68.8% in statutory cases, 1984-2006). 
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sidered inseparable from the meaning of the text."190 For this proposition 
the authors cite nothing, and I believe there is nothing they could have 
cited, for most legislators and their staff are unaware of the rule of lenity, 
and when they become aware of it they pass statutes seeking to negate its 
force.191 The rule of lenity, as the authors surmise, is one of the best 
known of their canons among academics and judges—and so drafters 
and legislators unaware of the rule of lenity are probably unaware of the 
more obscure canons that populate Scalia and Garner's list. 
Consider this broad point: Any collection of "valid canons" must pro 
vide a normative defense for why each canon or each cluster of canons is 
legitimate as a normative matter. Scalia and Garner do not provide persua 
sive or even tentative defenses for most of the canons they advance as 
"valid," and some of the more loaded canons, such as their broad version 
of the avoidance canon,192 are probably indefensible. In his earlier book, 
Justice Scalia assumed that most of the canons could be defended as 
commonsense presumptions about how any reader or speaker of the 
English language would approach a text.193 I am doubtful that most of 
the authors' canons would pass this test, and they provide zero evidence 
along these lines, but the democracy problem demands something more: 
Apart from the rule of lenity and other substantive rules, do the canons 
in Scalia and Garner's interpretive regime reflect precepts that Congress 
even knows about? If Congress is aware of the canons, do legislators and 
their staff believe them valid? Are they able to consider such canons 
when they draft and enact statutes? These are surprisingly difficult ques 
tions for Scalia and Garner's project. 
For statutes adopted in and before 1990, Congress could not have 
anticipated Scalia and Garner's interpretive regime, and if representa 
tives and their staff had anticipated their "valid canons" they would not 
have approved of many of them. Before 1990, drafters and representa 
tives in Congress would have reasonably assumed, and there is good evi 
dence they did assume, that Article III judges would routinely consider 
190. Scalia & Garner, supra note 2, at 31. 
191. See infra notes 232-233 (providing sources for legislator ignorance of or hostil 
ity to rule of lenity). 
192. For classic critiques of the broad Scalia/Garner version of the avoidance canon, 
see Henry J. Friendly, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and the Reading of Statutes, in Benchmarks 
196, 211-12 (1967) (emphasizing risk of avoidance canon's misuse); Richard A. Posner, 
The Federal Courts: Crisis and Reform 285 (1985) (cautioning against "enlarging] the 
already vast reach of constitutional prohibition [s]"); Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Avoiding 
Constitutional Questions, 35 B.C. L. Rev. 1003, 1004-05 (1994) (urging rejection of avoid 
ance doctrine in many cases); John F. Manning, The Nondelegation Doctrine as a Canon 
of Avoidance, 2000 Sup. Ct. Rev. 223, 228 (contending avoidance doctrine subverts non 
delegation doctrine); John Copeland Nagle, Delaware & Hudson Revisited, 72 Notre Dame 
L. Rev. 1495, 1497 (1997) (discussing doctrine's origination). 
193. Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 1, at 25-26; accord, Einer Elhauge, Statutory 
Default Rules: How to Interpret Unclear Legislation 113-48 (2008) (suggesting many 
canons are default rules probably reflecting preferences of typical enacting legislators). 
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committee reports and sponsors' statements that elaborated on the am 
biguous or vague provisions in the statute.194 The first empirical study of 
this topic established that drafting staff for congressional judiciary com 
mittees were substantially unaware of the Court's canons of statutory 
construction and did not draft statutes with the Court's precepts in 
mind.195 This was not a big problem before 1990, because the Supreme 
Court almost always considered relevant legislative history and the can 
ons did not play a primary role in the interpretation of federal statutes. 
The primacy has been reversed since 1990, with canons superseding leg 
islative history for most of the Justices. Thus, the democracy problem has 
become more acute: Does Congress even know about the governing can 
ons? Does Congress acquiesce in them? 
The answer is surely affirmative for some important canons. 
Statutory drafters as well as elected representatives would very probably 
assume that the enacted text is the primary source for discerning statu 
tory meaning;196 that ordinary meaning197 and precepts of grammar198 
will be critically important guides for lawyers as well as judges in figuring 
out what the text means; and that statutory definition sections will be 
carefully followed by interpreters,199 though legislative drafters and repre 
sentatives would certainly be astounded to learn that judges sometimes 
substitute a term's "normal" meaning for that contained in a statute's 
definitions section,200 as Justice Scalia tried to do in Sweet Home.201 
But what is the case for other canons? There are now data available 
for some tentative answers. Specifically, Professors Abbe Gluck and Lisa 
Bressman have conducted an unprecedented empirical survey of con 
gressional drafters, and their results allow us to provide an up-to-date as 
194. Statutory Interpretation and the Uses of Legislative History: Hearing Before the 
Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop., and the Admin, of Justice of the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 2 (1990) (statement of Rep. Robert W. Kastenmeier, Chairman, 
Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop., and the Admin, of Justice of the H. Comm. on 
the Judiciary) ("It is probably safe to say that most of us in Congress assume . . . legislative 
history can explain and amplify statutory language in ways that are instructive to the 
courts."). 
195. Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A 
Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 575, 597-605 (2002) (finding congressional 
drafters generally do not consider and often are unaware of textual and substantive can 
ons Court uses). 
196. Scalia 8c Garner, supra note 2, at 56-58 (discussing canon 2, supremacy-of-text 
principle). 
197. Id. at 69-77 (discussing canon 6). 
198. Id. at 140-43 (discussing canon 17). 
199. Id. at 225-33 (discussing canon 36). 
200. Id. at 228-29 (suggesting there are instances when "normal meaning should be 
applied" instead of "defined meaning"). 
201. Id. at 230-32 (summarizing Scalia's reasoning in his Sweet Home dissent). 
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sessment of the Scalia and Garner interpretive regime.202 Does Congress 
know about their canons? Does Congress find them acceptable? Do staff 
take them into account when they draft statutes? The answer to these 
questions is yes for many canons, no for many more canons, and yes for 
some of Scalia and Garner's anticanons. 
Professors Gluck and Bressman report that, from the perspective of 
congressional staff and legislators, statutory text is critically important, 
and so their study confirms the conventional wisdom and the text-based 
premise of Reading Law—but their next-most-critical finding ought to be 
unsettling for Scalia and Garner. Even though the Supreme Court has 
curtailed its reliance on legislative history since 1990, Congress has not. 
Gluck and Bressman report that "legislative history was emphatically 
viewed by almost all of our respondents—Republican and Democrat 
alike—as the most important drafting and interpretive tool apart from 
text."203 Indeed, Congress does not sharply differentiate between statu 
tory text and critical legislative history: Although each chamber formally 
votes only on the text of bills, members' votes are based upon their read 
ing of legislative history and summaries of the bills without even glancing 
at the wording of those bills.204 Moreover, based on their experience in 
government, congressional staff view committee reports as constraining 
upon judges, and not liberating.205 Notice how these findings deepen the 
democracy problem with Justice Scalia's belittling reference to the com 
mittee reports accompanying the 1982 ESA Amendments.206 Contrary to 
Justice Scalia's confident but unsupported assessment, legislators, staff, 
the executive department, and interest groups pay careful attention to 
representations in the relevant committee reports. The Gluck and 
Bressman report provides the most authoritative empirical support for 
what has long been the conventional wisdom among political scientists 
and law professors who have actually participated in and studied the leg 
islative process. 
Accordingly, the Gluck and Bressman report deepens the democracy 
problem inherent in Scalia and Garner's insistence that courts ought not 
consult legislative history and creates an even higher burden of justifica 
tion for such an exclusionary rule. Their report also puts to shame Justice 
Scalia's cynical attitude toward the seriousness of committee delibera 
202. Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the 
Inside: An Empirical Study of Legislative Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons, 65 Stan. L. 
Rev. (forthcoming May 2013) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). 
203. Id. (manuscript at 57). 
204. Id. (manuscript at 58-59). Surprisingly, some committees literally vote only on 
legislative history when they report bills to the chamber, and their members do not even 
have the text of the bills before them. Id. (manuscript at 59). 
205. Id. (manuscript at 60). 
206 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 730-31 
(1995) (Scalia,J., dissenting). 
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tions and reports, as expressed in his Sweet Home dissent.207 While Justice 
Scalia has repeatedly announced several normative justifications for an 
exclusionary rule, scholars have repeatedly demonstrated that none is 
cogent.208 
Professors Gluck and Bressman also report that very few of the pro 
fessional congressional staff have any idea what the avoidance canon 
stands for,209 and their results are even more astounding for the new 
clear statement rules Justice Scalia and his colleagues have created to 
protect federalism and other values.210 Only 28.5% of the professional 
staff said they could name a single one of the clear statement rules—and 
when asked to name one, only four of those "knowledgeable" staff mem 
bers were able to correctly identify such a rule, with none able to identify 
any of the federalism clear statement rules.211 Even the preemption 
canon212 was not well understood; a mere 5.84% of the respondents cor 
rectly identified the presumption as protecting state law, with double that 
number (11.68%) believing the presumption went the other way, and the 
rest completely clueless.213 None of the constitutional canons that Justice 
Scalia seems to think represent commonsense propositions are well 
known in Congress, and most of those canons are completely unknown 
to the legislators and their staff who formulate legislation. 
The Gluck and Bressman report on textual canons is also filled with 
surprises. One big surprise is that congressional staff do understand the 
concepts underlying the Latin canons (inclusio unius, noscitur a sociis, 
ejusdem generis) and do follow those concepts when drafting statutes.214 
Thus, if they have a list of items exempted from a statutory requirement, 
congressional staff assume that the list is exhaustive and that the items 
share a common theme. If they want to negate inferences, they know to 
use language to that effect. So rather than saying, "Sally may not kick, 
bite, or scratch her little brother," many drafters would know to say, 
"Sally may not harm her little brother, including harms resulting from 
her kicking, biting, or scratching little brother." 
207. See id. (belittling committee reports for not capturing Congress's "real-life 
expectations"). 
208. See supra note 13 (supporting use of legislative history). Compare Scalia, 
Interpretation, supra note 1 (arguing textualism is neither simplistic nor result-oriented, 
but logically consistent and rigorous), with Eskridge, Unknown Ideal, supra note 13 
(reviewing Matter of Interpretation). 
209. Gluck 8c Bressman, supra note 202 (manuscript at 48). 
210. See Scalia 8c Garner, supra note 2, at 281-94 (discussing presumptions against 
federal preemption and waiver of sovereign immunity). 
211. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 202 (manuscript at 38). 
212. See Scalia & Garner, supra note 2, at 290-94 (defining preemption canon as 
"presum[ption] that a federal statute does not preempt state law"). 
213. Gluck 8c Bressman, supra note 202 (manuscript at 53). 
214. Id. (manuscript at 39-40). 
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While some congressional staff were aware that the Supreme Court 
is updating statutory texts based upon the whole-text canon,215 the pre 
sumption of consistent usage,216 and the rule against surplusage,217 they 
did not follow those rules when drafting statutes, for practical reasons.218 
Indeed, the Senate and House staffers surveyed by Gluck and Bressman 
followed an approach that inverts the rule against surplusage. The rule 
against surplusage says that statutory terms should be broadly construed 
so that they do not duplicate other terms,219 but congressional staff tell us 
that they will purposely use redundant terms to make sure that all bases 
are covered and to satisfy interest groups and executive officials who are 
worried that their interests are not being adequately protected. Thus, 
when Congress defined "take" in the ESA, staff may have gone overboard 
in listing all the things humans can do to an endangered species. In light 
of this intelligence, the explanation from the House and Senate spon 
sors, who emphasized that the take provision covered attacks targeted at 
particular animals, ought to override the rule against surplusage that 
Justice Stevens invoked in Sweet Home.220 
It is shocking that so few of Scalia and Garner's "valid canons" are 
known or followed by congressional staff that draft statutes. It is espe 
cially surprising because the manuals used by the drafting offices of both 
the House and the Senate explicitly note most of the Scalia-Garner can 
ons, and a great many more.221 It is also surprising how little knowledge 
there still is regarding the Court's whole act and constitutional canons, 
because Jacob Scott's comprehensive survey of the fifty state legislated 
codes of statutory interpretation found that many or most state legisla 
tures have codified not only the ordinary meaning rule, but also the 
whole act rule, the presumption of consistent usage, and the rule against 
surplusage.222 
215. Scalia & Garner, supra note 2, at 167-69. 
216 Id. at 170-73. 
217. Id. at 174-79. 
218. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 202 (manuscript at 40-44). 
219. See Scalia & Garner, supra note 2, at 174-79 ("[C]ourts [should] avoid a read 
ing that renders some words altogether redundant.") 
220. See Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 
697-98 (1995) ("A reluctance to treat statutory terms as surplusage supports the reasona 
bleness of the ... interpretation [of'take.']"). 
221. B.J. Ard, Comment, Interpreting by the Book: Legislative Drafting Manuals and 
Statutory Interpretation, 120 Yale L.J. 185, 193 (2010) (listing canons included in congres 
sional drafting manuals). 
222. See Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 
Geo. L.J. 341, 357 tbl.l (2010) (noting widespread codification of ordinary meaning and 
dictionary rules but virtually no codification of inclusio unius, noscitur a sociis, or ejusdem 
generis); id. at 368 tbl.3 (noting widespread codification of whole act rule and presump 
tion of consistent usage, and moderate codification of rule against surplusage); id. at 388, 
391 tbls.8-9 (revealing relatively few states have codified avoidance rule or other constitu 
tional canons, except for presumption against retroactivity, which is widely codified). 
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Scott's survey also reports that twenty-two other states have codified 
the canon that an ambiguous statute should be interpreted to carry out 
the legislative purpose.223 Contrary to Scalia and Garner,224 nineteen 
state 
legislatures say that remedial statutes should be liberally construed, and 
seventeen states say that all statutes should be liberally construed.225 Also 
contrary to Scalia and Garner,226 eleven states have codified the presump 
tion that the legislature intends "reasonable" results.227 And, strongly con 
trary to Scalia and Garner, eleven states have codified the rule that legis 
lative history "may" be considered under various circumstances; no state 
has legislated against consideration of legislative history.228 
This Review refers to Scott's fascinating and unprecedented survey 
of state legislatively codified canons229 not to assert they are binding on 
judges but because they are further evidence relevant to the question: 
How would a reasonable legislator expect her statutes to be read? The 
methodology that both federal (Gluck and Bressman) and state (Scott) 
legislators appear to expect from courts focuses on a statute's ordinary 
meaning, read in the light of regular principles of grammar and word 
use, the problem the legislature was addressing and the purpose of the 
statute, and the consequences and reasonableness of the possible inter 
pretations. In my opinion, courts actually do follow this methodology 
most of the time, as the majority Justices did in Sweet Home,230 and so their 
methodology in practice is usually consistent with the expectations of 
Congress. And so in most cases, there is not a huge democracy problem 
with current practice—though I believe there would be a significant de 
mocracy problem if the Supreme Court were to adopt and follow the 
canons-based textualism explicated in Scalia and Garner's Reading Law. 
There is, to be sure, a democracy problem with the rule of lenity, a 
canon endorsed not just by Scalia and Garner,231 but also by most judges 
and commentators (including me). Legislators and their staff do not 
223. Id. at 397 tbl. 10. 
224. Scalia & Garner, supra note 2, at 364-66. 
225. Scott, supra note 222, at 402 tbl.ll. 
226. Scalia & Garner, supra note 2, at 343-54. 
227. Scott, supra note 222, at 402 tbl.ll. 
228. Id. at 383 tbl.7. 
229. Even though Scott's celebrated survey of legislatively codified canons was pub 
lished two years ago, Scalia and Garner do not cite it in their most comprehensive bibliog 
raphy and seem to be unaware that there are hundreds of legislatively codified canons. 
Scalia 8c Garner, supra note 2, at 244—45. Regardless, they disapprove of the practice be 
cause it is "likely to be an intrusion upon the courts' function of interpreting the laws." Id. 
at 245. This position would require much greater elaboration to be persuasive. Compare 
the brilliantly articulated position to the contrary in Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal 
Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 2085, 2148 (2002) (declaring canon 
codification "the most natural expansion of Congress' efforts to legislate interpretive strat 
egies"). 
230 Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687 (1995). 
231. Scalia & Garner, supra note 2, at 296-302. 
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know about the rule of lenity,232 and they do not approve of it when they 
have deliberated.233 As Scalia and Garner say, therefore, the rule of lenity 
certainly cannot be justified by assuming reasonable legislator expecta 
tions,234 but I believe it can be justified as a quasi-constitutional insistence 
by judges that the Due Process Clause demands that statutes imposing 
criminal penalties be relatively clear. In addition, the rule of lenity, al 
most unique among the canons, creates a productive dialogue between 
the Court and Congress: the rule of lenity cuts only one way, against the 
Department of Justice, which is almost always able to secure congres 
sional consideration of an override bill if the Department thinks its re 
jected interpretation is really important to the administration of the 
criminal law.235 
I am not as certain as Scalia and Garner that the avoidance canon 
can be justified as a matter of either institutional dialogue or our sub 
stantive commitments, and I am highly dubious that most of the other 
antidemocratic canons in Reading Law can be justified. The authors' 
anticanon opposing use of legislative history strikes me as profoundly 
misguided as well as undemocratic, for the reasons advanced above. The 
whole act canons236 ought to be applied much less dogmatically and 
much more purposively than Scalia and Garner would suggest, with the 
rule against surplusage237 retired from judicial action. The absurd results 
canon238 ought to be applied in light of legislative purpose and ex 
panded: If a statutory text seems to have a meaning that is unreasonable 
in light of the legislative purpose, the judge should reconsider her read 
ing and study the legislative history more deeply (though sticking with 
the harsh reading if supported by the legislative history). 
232. Gluck & Bressman, supra note 202 (manuscript at 100-01 & n.470) (reporting 
fewer than 10% of legislators and staffers surveyed were familiar with rule of lenity). 
233. Dan M. Kahan, Lenity and Federal Common Law Crimes, 1994 Sup. Ct. Rev. 
345, 384 ("Unlike federal courts, state courts did aggressively enforce strict construction in 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In response, many state legislatures abro 
gated strict construction universally within their criminal codes.") 
234. See Scalia & Garner, supra note 2, at 299. 
235. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation 
Decisions, 101 Yale L.J. 331, 344 & tbl.4 (1991) [hereinafter Eskridge, Overriding] 
(demonstrating leading category of congressional overrides of Supreme Court statutory 
opinions, 1967-1990, was criminal law overrides, where Congress accepted Department of 
Justice invitations to broaden criminal statute with more explicit language). 
236. Scalia & Garner, supra note 2, at 167-233. 
237. Id. at 174-79. 
238. Id. at 234-39. 
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Conclusion 
A. What Are the Canons For ? How Should They Be Deployed ? 
One important lesson I derived from Reading Law is that the canons 
of statutory construction are more complicated and problematic than I 
once thought. The late Professor Philip Frickey and I once suggested that 
the canons constitute an "interpretive regime" that renders statutory in 
terpretation "more predictable, regular, and coherent."239 After Reading 
Law, I have learned a lot about the canons, though some of what I 
learned is not what Scalia and Garner were trying to teach me. 
A central lesson I draw from Reading Law is that the canons of 
statutory interpretation require normative justification, both individually 
and as an overall interpretive regime. This is an important idea, but one 
that is not carried through in any systematic way by the authors. In this 
conclusion, I would like to sketch the contours of such a normative calcu 
lus. I shall start with the three different kinds of justifications that are 
relevant to evaluate or defend particular canons or a canonical regime 
more generally. 
1. Rule of Law Values. — Most of the time, Reading Law operates un 
der the assumption that the rule of law values of predictability, objectiv 
ity, and coherence are the linchpin for the "valid canons," both individu 
ally and as an interpretive regime. The rule of law counts as a justification 
for a canon or cluster of canons that renders statutes more predictable in 
their application, that impels judges to read statutes without regard to 
their own political preferences, and that is coherent with the broad array 
of legal and constitutional rules we follow. Everyone believes in the rule 
of law generally and in the virtues of predictability and so forth. Indeed, 
rule of law justifications work very well for some of the textual canons. By 
insisting that statutes be read according to their ordinary meanings and 
accepted rules of grammar and punctuation, courts arguably contribute 
to law's predictability—although I do not believe the Supreme Court 
needs to canonize these common-sense precepts in order for them to 
contribute to the rule of law. It is hard to tell whether the more technical 
textual canons, such as inclusio unius and noscitur a sociis, contribute to 
law's predictability: because these canons depend on normative judg 
ments about statutory purpose, they will operate less predictably. Indeed, 
there is no empirical, or even casually empirical, evidence that these 
canons make statutory law more predictable, and there is some evidence 
that they render law less predictable and more ideologically inflected. 
If the case for most of the textual canons is shaky under rule of law 
criteria, the rule of law case is even harder to make for the substantive 
239. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Supreme Court, 1993 Term— 
Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 26, 66 (1994), noted with approval by 
Scalia & Garner, supra note 2, at 60 n.10. 
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canons. Many of the substantive rules, such as the avoidance canon, de 
pend on unpredictable, context-driven substantive judgments by ideolog 
ically inspired judges; under those circumstances, the canons can un 
dermine the rule of law. Thus, an interpretive regime populated only by 
the ordinary meaning and grammar canons would be much more pre 
dictable than one that also included the avoidance canon because that 
substantive canon takes away some of the predictability potentially en 
gendered by these textual canons.240 And when there are so many 
substantive canons, as the dozens that the Supreme Court has recog 
nized, the predictability problems can only get worse. 
Under rule of law criteria, the most defensible canons are those that 
Scalia and Garner do not include in their analysis (though they have no 
objection either), namely the stare decisis and the agency deference 
canons. To be sure, there is no rigorous empirical demonstration that 
stare decisis or agency deference increases law's predictability, but our 
legal culture credibly assumes that this is the case. Once the Supreme 
Court has authoritatively construed a statute, that issue and others closely 
related to it are resolved until Congress overrides the Court. And the 
Court's various deference canons enhance the predictability of law by 
assuring citizens that a nationwide agency interpretation resolves even 
difficult issues.241 While stare decisis and agency deference are doctrines 
that can be evaded or manipulated at the margins, it is sensible to think 
that for the most part each doctrine makes law more predictable and 
constrains lower court judges in particular. 
So many of Scalia and Garner's "valid canons" are hard or impossi 
ble to defend under the rule of law criteria the authors endorse. Moreo 
ver, the interpretive regime—the collection of canons—they endorse is 
one that is demonstrably at odds with the rule of law virtues. Thus, the 
empirical work of Professors Brudney and Ditslear suggests, tentatively 
for now, that judges following the Scalia and Garner textual canons and 
ignoring legislative history (as recommended by Scalia and Garner) are 
going to be less constrained by law than judges applying these canons in 
light of legislative history. This is a serious problem for the announced 
project of Reading Law. 
240. In Sweet Home, the statutory definition and ordinary meaning canons would cre 
ate greater predictability: If all the judges applied only those canons, and purged their 
hearts of substantive concerns, there ought to have been unanimity among the D.C. 
Circuit judges and the Supreme Court Justices. But if you add the avoidance canon to the 
mix, some of the judges would be tempted to vote for the "simplest farmer," so as to avoid 
Fifth Amendment "takings" concerns with the agency's highly regulatory approach. 
241. See Peter L. Strauss, One Hundred and Fifty Cases Per Year: Some Implications 
of the Supreme Court's Limited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 
Colum. L. Rev. 1093 (1987) (arguing for agency deference as desirable in part because 
agency interpretations create nationwide uniformity more quickly and easily than case-by 
case adjudication). 
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As I have suggested above, however, predictability and other rule of 
law justifications are not the only normative considerations that count 
when evaluating which are "valid canons" and whether an overall inter 
pretive regime is legitimate or desirable. For example, an interpretive 
regime with a canon providing that statutes will be presumed to exclude 
"homosexuals" from governmental privileges and benefits is a regime 
that is pretty predictable (gay people generally lose), and indeed this is 
the regime the United States Supreme Court and Congress have tradi 
tionally followed.242 But such a canon is now constitutionally questiona 
ble,243 and an interpretive regime including such a canon is no longer 
acceptable. Likewise, a canon that statutory text should be given its plain 
meaning even when that reading is unreasonable in light of unques 
tioned congressional purpose244 is also a canon that would yield more 
predictability in law, but such a canon can be doubted on separation of 
powers and democratic accountability grounds. Recall that legislators 
assume that their statutes will be applied reasonably, in light of their 
purpose (s); a strict, unbending plain meaning rule undermines their 
work, as the House of Lords found when it abandoned its exclusion-of 
legislative history rule in 1992.245 Correlatively, many canons and some 
canonical regimes might be defended by reference to values outside of 
the rule of law values embraced by Scalia and Garner. 
2. Democracy Values. — Democracy counts as a justification for a 
canon or cluster of canons that facilitates Congress's adoption of statutes 
that will, in operation, reflect the aims, goals, and compromises that 
drove the legislative process. The legitimacy of a statutory directive de 
rives in large part from the fact that the directive has been endorsed by 
representatives not only elected by We the People, but also accountable 
to Us as well. So canons that link statutory interpretations to democratic 
accountability can be justified because they are consistent with the opera 
tion of our democratic governance structure. 
242. See, e.g., Boutilier v. INS, 387 U.S. 118, 122 (1967) (including homosexuals in 
groups considered "afflicted with a psychopathic personality" under Immigration and 
Nationality Act of 1952); see also Defense of Marriage Act of 1996, 1 U.S.C. § 7, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1738C (2006) (adopting broad statutory codification of this traditional canon of statu 
tory interpretation). For a critique of Boutilier by Scalia and Garner, see Scalia & Garner, 
supra note 2, at 389-90 (criticizing Court's use of legislative history to define term 
"psychopathic personality" instead of relying on historical meanings). 
243. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (finding state constitution's gen 
eral exclusion of gay people from state protective laws violates Equal Protection Clause). 
244. See Scalia & Garner, supra note 2, at 237-38 (approving absurd outcome in 
Chung Fook v. White, 264 U.S. 443 (1924), because absurdity doctrine is meant to correct 
obviously unintended dispositions, not absurd purposeful dispositions). 
245. Pepper v. Hart, [1992] A.C. 593 (H.L.) 634 (U.K.); see James J. Brudney, The 
Story of Pepper v. Hart. Examining Legislative History Across the Pond, in Statutory 
Interpretation Stories 258, 274 (William N. Eskridge, Jr., Philip P. Frickey & Elizabeth 
Garrett eds., 2011) (identifying allowing courts to "give effect to the intention of 
Parliament" as primary reason for modifying exclusionary rule). 
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Exactly as Scalia and Garner suppose, democracy values are often 
connected to rule of law values. For the easiest example, the ordinary 
meaning and grammar canons, if rigorously applied by courts, facilitate 
the legislative process by rendering statutes more predictable to legisla 
tors. The Gluck and Bressman survey of congressional drafters suggests 
that noscitur a sociis and inclusio unius find support in democracy val 
ues, as Congress relies on these canons in statutory drafting.246 On the 
other hand, some of the whole act canons are inconsistent with demo 
cratic values, because Congress is drafting statutes without attention to 
these canons. Indeed, the rule against surplusage, invoked by the Sweet 
Home majority,247 is especially problematic because the legislative process 
operates under the opposite assumption and so that canon will often 
thwart legislative deals rather than enforce them. Likewise, most of the 
substantive canons are inconsistent with democratic premises and there 
fore require strong justification on some other basis. 
The legislative history canons are democracy-enhancing because 
they help unelected judges, strangers to the statutory project, to under 
stand the policy assumptions, trade-offs, purposes, and deals that charac 
terize the serious process of statute-making in our system. Thus, everyone 
now endorses Hart and Sack's idea that statutes should be construed to 
carry out their purposes, so long as the best interpretation does not im 
pose upon the words a meaning they will not bear.248 In many cases, one 
cannot understand the nuances of congressional purpose (s) without at 
tention to legislative history—often (as in Sweet Home) the history of statu 
tory amendments. To be sure, Scalia and Garner are correct to worry that 
judges will not interpret legislative history astutely enough, and that con 
cern is now animating the important work of Professor Victoria Nourse, 
who is generating rules (canons) for judicial use of legislative history.249 
Democracy is also a potential justification for Chevron and some 
other canons of deference to administrative agencies and presidential 
decisionmaking. As the Chevron Court acknowledged, in cases where 
Congress has not answered an interpretive question, it is consistent with 
democratic governance for unelected judges to decline to substitute their 
policy judgments for those of agencies that are accountable to the 
President and/or Congress.250 
246. See supra note 214 and accompanying text. 
247. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great Or., 515 U.S. 687, 697-98 
(1995). 
248. See Hart & Sacks, supra note 3, at 114—17 (discussing interplay of law and lan 
guage). 
249. Nourse, Rules, supra note 40. 
250. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984). 
See Elhauge, Statutory Default Rules, supra note 193, at 79-111 (defending Court's 
Chevron doctrine on ground that agencies will reflect current legislative as well as presiden 
tial preferences); Bradley Lipton, Accountability, Deference, and the Skidmore Doctrine, 
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3. Public Values. — Substantive values that are unquestionably cher 
ished in our history might justify canons that place a thumb on the scales 
of justice in support of those values. As Professor Philip Frickey and I 
have argued, statutory interpretation might be a situs for application of 
"underenforced" constitutional norms.251 In all probability, the public 
values that courts can most effectively support are institutional or process 
values, such as separation of powers, federalism, and deliberation. Of 
course, judicial enforcement of public values typically comes at the ex 
pense of democracy and often the rule of law as well. How should a theo 
rist deal with the devilish question of competing values? 
Thus, each canon might be subject to both defense and critique on 
the basis of these three different values. For example, the case for the 
rule of lenity is rendered quite complicated by the foregoing array of val 
ues. I am inclined to agree with Scalia and Garner that the rule of lenity 
is applied so unevenly that it adds little or nothing to law's predictabil 
ity.252 The evidence is strong that legislators do not approve of the rule of 
lenity, and so there is every reason to believe that the rule of lenity is un 
democratic.253 Should the rule be abandoned? I vote no, and I cannot 
improve upon the reason given by Scalia and Garner: "[W]hen the gov 
ernment means to punish, its commands must be reasonably clear. When 
they are not clear, the consequences should be visited on the party more 
able to avoid and correct the effects of shoddy legislative drafting— 
namely, the federal Department of Justice or its state equivalent."254 
119 Yale L.J. 2096, 2120-22 (2010) (defending Court's Skidmore doctrine on ground that 
agencies will reflect legislative preferences as well as nation's political culture). 
251. Eskridge & Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional, supra note 121, at 630-31. On the no 
tion of "underenforced constitutional norms" and what to do about them, see generally 
Neal Kumar Katyal, Judges as Advicegivers, 50 Stan. L. Rev. 1709 (1998) (advocating judi 
cial "advicegiving"—judges recommending rather than mandating particular courses of 
action—as alternative to aggressive judicial reform); Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., 
Constitutional Flares: On Judges, Legislatures, and Dialogue, 83 Minn. L. Rev. 1, 8 (1998) 
(weighing desirability of judges "send[ing] constitutional flares . . . [or] clear warnings to 
Congress regarding the potential applicability of constitutional constraints on its policy 
choices"); Lawrence Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced 
Constitutional Norms, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 1212 (1978) (arguing underenforced constitu 
tional norms are nonetheless valid to their conceptual limits and fully enforceable by 
Congress and state courts); Ernest Young, Constitutional Avoidance, Resistance Norms, 
and the Preservation of Judicial Review, 78 Tex. L. Rev. 1549, 1585-87 (2000) (defending 
avoidance canon and its use in cases under AEDPA and IIRIRA as means of enforcing 
Constitution). 
252. Scalia & Garner, supra note 2, at 298-99. 
253. See Robert Yablon, Lenity Without Mercy: Matching the Rule to Its Purpose 35 
n.162 (2006) (unpublished Supervised Analytical Writing, Yale Law School) (on file with 
the Columbia Law Review) (identifying states that have legislated, usually without success, to 
negate the rule of lenity). 
254. Scalia & Garner, supra note 2, at 299. For an earlier argument along these lines, 
see Eskridge, Dynamic, supra note 26; Eskridge, Overriding, supra note 235, at 376 ("In 
criminal law, the rule of lenity often impels the Court to demand greater precision from 
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So I am with Scalia and Garner in balancing the normative consider 
ations for and against the rule of lenity, and their complicated normative 
analysis of the rule of lenity is exemplary. Unfortunately, it is also excep 
tional in their book, for most of the "valid canons" they list are accompa 
nied by no careful balancing of normative pros and cons, and many of 
the valid canons find no defense whatsoever in the pages of Reading Law. 
To be sure, many of the canons on their list are ones where my own cost 
benefit analysis would weigh heavily in favor of the particular canons 
Scalia and Garner endorse.255 Other canons are so vaguely acceptable 
that they would probably pass any reasonable normative test, if for no 
other reason than their costs and benefits are indeterminate but their 
animating ideas are winsome enough to break any tie in their favor.256 A 
good many of the canons are defensible, but only if articulated somewhat 
differently than Scalia and Garner characterize them.257 Several of the 
Scalia-Garner canons strike me as indefensible and, indeed, are not de 
fended by the authors by reference to empirical evidence or other rela 
tively neutral argumentation.258 
elderly criminal statutes, which Congress, pressured by the Department of Justice, is often 
willing to provide."). 
255. Among the canons that I should endorse include the following: the supremacy 
(I would say primacy-) of-text principle, Scalia & Garner, supra note 2, at 56-58; the pur 
pose canon, id. at 63-65; the ordinary-meaning canon, id. at 69-77; the grammar canon, 
id. at 140-43; the preamble and title canons, id. at 217-24; the interpretive direction 
canon that courts should "carefully" follow statutory definitions, id. at 225-33; the pre 
sumption against retroactivity, id. at 261-65; and the presumption against implied repeal, 
id. at 327-33. 
256. Among these vague but winsome canons are the following: the "interpretation" 
principle that every application of a text to particular circumstances entails interpretation, 
id. at 53-55; the presumption of validity, id. at 66-68; the general-terms canon, id. at 101— 
06; the whole-text canon, id. at 167-69; the presumption against preemption, id. at 290 
94; and the desuetude canon that statutes are not repealed by nonuse, id. at 336-40. 
257. For examples of canons that are indefensible in the form articulated by Scalia 
and Garner, I'd include the following: the absurdity doctrine, id. at 234-40, which ought 
to include an admonition against reading statutes to reach results that are unreasonable 
from the perspective of legislative purpose; the constitutional avoidance doctrine, id. at 
247-51, which probably ought to be formulated more narrowly, as most scholars (from a 
wide array of perspectives) have maintained; the presumption against waiver or abrogation 
of sovereign immunity, id. at 281-89, which ought not to require that the disposition is 
"unequivocally clear," id. at 281. 
258. Thus, the authors' rejection of the "false notion" that committee reports and 
sponsor statements can be "worthwhile aids in statutory construction," id. at 369, strikes 
me as strongly inconsistent with democracy and public values and not supported by the 
rule of law concerns that persuade Scalia and Garner against these sources. I also do not 
see the normative case for the fixed-meaning canon, id. 78-92, which undervalues the 
dynamism of language and the shifting context for statutory meaning; for the negative 
implication canon, inclusio unius, see id. at 107-11, which is highly manipulable in prac 
tice and represents an unjustified antiregulatory bias; for the unintelligibility canon, id. at 
134-39, which is rarely, if ever, invoked by the Supreme Court; for the presumption of 
consistent usage, id. at 170-73, and the surplusage canon, id. at 174-79, both of which are 
strongly antidemocratic; for the associated-words canon, noscitur a sociis, id. at 195-98, 
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After thinking about Scalia and Garner's list of preferred canons 
and about the Supreme Court's much more elaborate collection of can 
ons (most of which are substantive), I am beset by doubts whether either 
interpretive regime is justified by the kind of normative cost-benefit anal 
ysis conducted above. In the published version of his Tanner Lectures at 
Princeton University, Justice Scalia opined that the textual canons are 
"commonsensical" and rather harmless but that the "dice-loading" 
(substantive) canons are "a lot of trouble" for the "honest textualist."259 
Ironically, after the elaborate analysis of Reading Law provided in this 
Review, I find Scalia's earlier view increasingly attractive. 
The Supreme Court might be wise to abandon the canons of statu 
tory interpretation and to adopt the following simplified regime: Inter 
pret statutory texts in light of ordinary meaning and correct grammar, 
authoritative precedent, and statutory purpose (discerned from the text 
and legislative history). If there is ambiguity, defer to an agency interpre 
tation except in criminal cases (where the state should lose if ambiguity 
remains). Such a stripped-down approach is theoretically superior to that 
followed by the Supreme Court or propounded by Scalia and Garner: Its 
results are probably more predictable, the method is certainly more con 
sistent with the assumptions of the legislative process, and it reflects the 
most important public value (lenity) judges can be trusted to enforce, 
while leaving to more accountable agencies most of the policy judg 
ments.260 
The Supreme Court of the United States is, by now, probably too in 
vested in the canons to abandon that regime wholesale—but such an ex 
periment could more easily be attempted by a state supreme court.261 As 
much as the idea of a radically simplified interpretive regime for statu 
tory interpretation attracts me, ultimately I believe that statutory inter 
pretation in cases like Sweet Home is complicated, and so a complicated 
set of canons matches up with the enterprise itself. Additionally, a 
stripped-down regime would send many relevant interpretive considera 
tions into a legal closet. One virtue of the Court's massive array of canons 
and ejusdem generis canon, id. at 199-213, which seem to be so manipulable in practice; 
or for the presumption against change in the common law, id. at 318-19, because chang 
ing the common law is the point of most federal super-statutes and many other laws. Most 
of the Scalia and Garner "falsities," id. at 341-410, are either overstated or unpersuasively 
justified by the authors. 
259. Scalia, Interpretation, supra note 1, at 25-29. 
260. Cf. Vermeule, supra note 40 (arguing for no-frills textualism that would jettison 
most canons, unfortunately including legislative history and purpose canons as well as rule 
of lenity, and would defer to agencies even more than my stripped-down approach would 
suggest). 
261. See Abbe R. Gluck, States as Laboratories of Statutory Interpretation: 
Methodological Consensus and the New Modified Textualism, 119 Yale L.J. 1750, 1771 
1811 (2010) (examining various state supreme court interpretive regimes, including one 
followed for almost two decades by Oregon Supreme Court, which bears some similarity to 
proposal in text). 
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is that they express the complexity and substantivity of the interpretive 
enterprise. 
If we accept the complexity and numerosity of the canons, as 
Garner, Scalia, and I do, another matter becomes tremendously im 
portant. That is, how the canons interact is as important as the content 
and caveats for each individual canon.262 Reading Law not only reflects 
that general proposition but also illustrates how canonical interaction is 
bound to be hierarchical: Some canons will trump others. Although 
Scalia and Garner do not openly endorse the hierarchy of canons, here is 
the hierarchy I derive from their book: 
(1) At the top of the hierarchy are what Philip Frickey and I dubbed 
super-strong clear statement rules', judicial policies that Congress cannot 
trump by a statutory plain meaning and need, instead, to provide an 
"unequivocally clear" statement263 to that effect.264 As examples of such 
rules, Scalia and Garner endorse the requirement of unequivocally clear 
statements from Congress to waive federal and abrogate state sovereign 
immunity.265 Their version of the constitutional avoidance canon, which 
allows avoidance unless Congress has spoken clearly,266 might also qual 
ify, for in practice the avoidance canon sometimes amounts to a super 
strong clear statement rule that trumps ordinary meaning.267 The rule 
against absurd results is an even stronger example and might be under 
stood as a super-strong clear statement rule as well. The presumption 
against implied repeals268 also operates, in practice, as a super-strong 
clear statement rule, especially in the hands of Justice Scalia, who loves 
this canon.269 
262. Scalia & Garner, supra note 2, at 59-62 (noting canons often "work against each 
other" but still have great value). 
263. Id. at 281. 
264. See generally Eskridge & Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional, supra note 121 (explor 
ing advent of "super-strong clear statement rules" by judiciary and their effects). 
265. Scalia & Garner, supra note 2, at 281-89. 
266. Id. at 247-51 (endorsing canon that avoids statutory interpretations that would 
"even raise serious questions of constitutionality" unless meaning is absolutely clear). 
267. Compare Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 2508 
(2011) (ignoring, for virtually unanimous Court including Justice Scalia, statutory defini 
tional section and creating judicial exception that avoided constitutional evaluation of 
Voting Rights Act), with id. at 2517-18 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (demonstrating majority's interpretation was squarely contrary to only plausible 
meaning of statutory text). 
268. Scalia & Garner, supra note 2, at 327-33 ("The essence of the presumption 
against implied repeals is that if statutes are to be repealed, they should be repealed with 
some specificity."). 
269. Compare Branch v. Smith, 538 U.S. 254, 273 (2003) (Scalia, J., plurality opin 
ion) (rewriting completely old statute to avoid conclusion that it was implicitly repealed by 
later one), with id. at 304 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (ridi 
culing playfully Justice Scalia's opinion for rewriting statutory text, contrary to rules in A 
Matter of Interpretation). 
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(2) Next are the semantic, syntactical, contextual, and term of art can 
ons270 that, understood as a cluster of textual canons, establish whether 
the statute has a plain meaning. Under the premises of the new textual 
ism, plain meaning trumps everything else unless there is a super-strong 
clear statement rule in play. I would add to this important level the stare 
decisis canon: If the court of last resort has interpreted the statute, sub 
sequent judges are bound by that interpretation when it is on point and, 
even where not controlling, will reason from the earlier precedent (s). 
(3) The remainder of the canons are the residual rules that resolve 
statutory ambiguities. Thus, if there is neither a plain meaning nor a 
super-strong clear statement rule in play, judges are supposed to con 
sider, where relevant, legislative purpose,271 presumptions against 
retroactivity272 and extraterritorial effect,273 a presumption against 
preemption of state law,274 the rule of lenity and the mens rea canon in 
criminal cases,275 and the common law as the background norm where 
statutes do not control.276 To these, I should add the various agency 
deference canons: Unless a statute has a plain meaning, agency interpre 
tations usually fill the gap.277 
This is a pretty tidy interpretive regime. It might not improve the 
predictability of judicial decisions and might be antidemocratic, but tidi 
ness has an aesthetic value that appeals to many lawyers and judges. 
If I had to choose between a stripped-down minimalist regime and 
the tidy interpretive regime outlined in Scalia and Garner's Reading Law, 
I would opt for the latter. This is, ultimately, the authors' best pitch for 
their list of "valid canons": In the modern era, they maintain, there is 
nothing but "confusion" among scholars and judges about statutory in 
terpretation, and their book is the first to offer a "sound approach" to 
the subject.278 I believe these claims are overstated and that there is a 
third choice that dominates both the minimalist regime and the Scalia 
and Garner regime. As the Justices' debate in Sweet Home illustrates, 
judges are not confused about statutory interpretation, and Justice 
270. Scalia Sc Garner, supra note 2, at 69-240, 320-26. 
271. Id. at 63-65. 
272. Id. at 261-65. 
273. Id. at 268-72. 
274. Id. at 290-94. 
275. Id. at 296-312. 
276. Id. at 318-19. 
277. See supra note 167 and accompanying text (noting Court's Chevron doctrine of 
deferring to agencies' reasonable statutory interpretations). 
278. See Scalia & Garner, supra note 2, at 3-15 (claiming their treatise is "the first 
modern attempt ... to collect and arrange only the valid canons" in a world of confused 
statutory interpretation). 
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Scalia's approach is less sound than the one followed by the Supreme 
Court for most of the last century.279 
What is that approach? As Phil Frickey, Nick Zeppos, and I have 
demonstrated, the post-New Deal interpretive regime followed by the 
Supreme Court is pragmatic.280 The Court considers its role in statutory 
interpretation to be responsive to concerns relating to the rule of law, 
democracy, and public values. No single norm always trumps the others, 
and each norm lends support to different sources forjudges to apply in 
statutory interpretation. Like Scalia and Garner, we maintain that the 
Court follows and should follow a hierarchy, but instead of their hierar 
chy we maintain that the Court follows and should follow the "funnel of 
abstraction." 
Translated into the canons, the funnel suggests that the most con 
crete canons (the textual ones) are the most normatively compelling 
when they are applicable (i.e., when the text is not vague or ambiguous). 
Thus, if a statute has a plain meaning, based on its ordinary meaning or 
its meaning in light of the whole act, that meaning should usually be ap 
plied because it is consistent with the rule of law, very probably reflects 
legislative expectations, and reflects the public value of democratic de 
liberation. Where these sources do not speak clearly enough, however, 
other canons will govern, such as those focusing on legislative purpose 
and expectations, agency constructions and reliance interests, and public 
values, depending on how strongly each canon cuts. See the chart below 
for our hierarchy, set forth canonically: 
279. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text (arguing Scalia's Sweet Home dis 
sent was "deploying canons to imbue authoritative legal texts with [his] policy prefer 
ences" and that his "canonical approach" is "more of a normative than a neutral applica 
tion of the rule of law"). 
280. See Eskridge & Frickey, Practical Reasoning, supra note 6, at 364-65 (describing 
tendency of Supreme Court to use pragmatic approach to statutory interpretation even 
while purporting not to); Zeppos, supra note 56, at 1091-1120 (providing empirical survey 
of use of authority by Court, 1890-1990, and reporting Court deployed eclectic range of 
sources, consistent with Eskridge and Frickey pragmatic model). 
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Most Abstract 
Canons 







Legislative Expectation Canons 
(Committee Report, Absurd 
Results) 
Stare Decisis Canon 
(Follow and Reason from 
Precedent) 
Whole Act Canons 
(Purpose, Antiderogation, No 
Implied Repeals) 
Textual Canons 
(Ordinary Meaning, Grammar, 
Technical Meaning) 
Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Sweet Home carefully 
adhered to the funnel of abstraction, and both invoked all six levels of 
canons—with the irony that Justice Scalia, the skeptic of legislative his 
tory, deployed the legislative history of the 1973 Act to win the debate 
about the original statute, in my opinion, only to see it slip away based on 
the legislative history of the 1982 Amendments. 
I should add that our funnel metaphor is different from Reading Law 
in another way. Like Scalia and Garner, we think the canons "interrelate" 
to one another281—but unlike them, we think that they interrelate deeply 
rather than formally. That is, the judge applying the larger array of can 
ons contemplated by the funnel of abstraction does not apply the textual 
canons in isolation. Instead, she or he forms tentative conclusions from 
thinking about the ordinary meaning and reconsiders them as she or he 
examines other sources, including legislative history. That is, a judge's 
announcement that "the statute has a plain meaning" comes only after 
she or he has considered legislative history and purpose, precedent, 
agency views, reliance interests, and public values. 
Thus, the textual canons do not operate independently of the pur 
pose and precedent canons. Indeed, what I admire most about Justice 
Scalia's interpretation of the original 1973 Act in Sweet Home is the way he 
integrated ordinary meaning, common law baselines, whole act and 
whole code analysis, legislative history and purpose, and quasi-constitu 
tional norms to produce a powerful indictment of the agency's over 
reaching in 1975. What I admire less about his dissenting opinion is that 
it ran out of steam at the critical moment, when Justice Scalia had to con 
281. Scalia & Garner, supra note 2, at 59-62. 
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front the 1982 Amendments to the statute. Not only did he have no co 
gent response to the majority's reliance on legislative history (right after 
he had deployed it so effectively himself), but his snide put-down of 
committee reports leaves the reader with the impression of judicial ra 
ther than agency arrogance. 
What fundamentally separates me from Scalia and Garner is not a 
lack of enthusiasm for textual analysis but instead my view that "prevail 
ing confusion"282 is not the right way to characterize the Supreme Court's 
practice in statutory interpretation. That statutory interpretation, in prac 
tice, considers different kinds of sources (legislative materials as well as 
text, agency views as well as judicial values) does not mean the interpre 
tive regime is confused, unpredictable, or lawless. As Judge Frank 
Easterbrook puts it in the Foreword to Reading Law, "[professional 
norms—including norms about interpretive method—produce much 
more consensus than would be expected if judges' decisions mirrored 
the disagreement in legislative bodies or political debates."283 
282. Id. at 9. 
283. Easterbrook, supra note 6, at xxiv. 
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